Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 18 | Issue 3

Article 5

2012

Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited and
Other Emerging E-Discovery Issues under the
Amended Federal Rules
William P. Barnette

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William P. Barnette, Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited and Other Emerging E-Discovery Issues under the Amended Federal Rules, 18
Rich. J.L. & Tech 11 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol18/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

GHOST IN THE MACHINE: ZUBULAKE REVISITED AND OTHER
EMERGING E-DISCOVERY ISSUES UNDER THE
AMENDED FEDERAL RULES
By William P. Barnette*

Cite as: William P. Barnette, Ghost in the Machine: Zubulake Revisited
and Other Emerging E-Discovery Issues Under the Amended Federal
Rules, XVIII Rich. J. L. & Tech. 11 (2012), http://jolt.richmo
nd.edu/v18i3/article11.pdf.

“I am all for your using machines, but do not let them use you.”
Winston Churchill 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

[1]
We live in a digital age. 2 Electronically stored information
(“ESI”) “is commonplace in our personal lives and in the operation of
* William P. Barnette is Counsel—Commercial Litigation for The Home Depot. His
primary responsibility is managing the company’s class action and other complex
commercial litigation. Mr. Barnette publishes and lectures frequently on all aspects of
complex and class action litigation, including issues related to e-discovery. His most
recent works were published in the Cleveland State Law Review and the University of
Detroit Mercy Law Review. The views expressed herein are the author’s alone.
1

MARTIN GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: NEVER DESPAIR, 1945-1965 at 210 (Vol.
VIII 1988).
2

MARK HELPRIN, DIGITAL BARBARISM 9 (2009) (“The history of the last hundred years
has been, as much as anything else, the process of encoding information . . . . With binary
coding, electrons as messengers, and the hard-fought mathematical adaptation necessary
for control, we can now do almost everything in regard to information. We may, for
example, look through billions of pages in an instant . . . .”); see also BARBARA J.
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET

1
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businesses, public entities, and private organizations.” 3 By now the
numbers no longer shock: “more than 90% of all corporate information is
electronic; 4 North American businesses exchange over 2.5 trillion e-mails
per year; 5 today, less than 1% of all communication will ever appear in
paper form; and, on average, a 1000-person corporation will generate
nearly 2 million e-mails annually.” 6

GUIDE FOR JUDGES 1 (Federal Judicial Center 2007) [hereinafter Pocket Guide],
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf (“It
is a fact of modern life that an enormous volume of information is created, exchanged,
and stored electronically.”).
3

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 1. ESI “includes e-mails, webpages, word processing
files, and databases stored in the memory of computers, magnetic disks (such as
computer hard drives and floppy disks), optical disks (such as DVDs and CDs), and flash
memory (such as ‘thumb’ or ‘flash’ drives).” Id. at 2.
4

Indeed, as early as 2002, 92% of new information was stored on magnetic media,
primarily hard disks. See Peter Lyman & Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? 2003,
U. Cal. AT BERKELEY Sch. OF Inf. Mgmt. & Sys., http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/rese
arch/projects/how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
5

Id. E-mail creates “about 400,000 terabytes of new information each year worldwide.”
Id. Meanwhile, instant messaging “generates 5 billion (750GB) messages a day, or 274
terabytes a year.” Id. It is estimated that in 2009 some 247 billion e-mails were sent per
day. Stephen D. Brody et al., Zealous Advocacy and the Discovery Process: Does the
Duty to Cooperate Leave Room for Lawyering After National Day Laborer?, 212 PLI/NY
271, 275-76 (2011).
6

Dale M. Cendali et al., Potential Ethical Pitfalls in Electronic Discovery, SM090 ALIABA 1421, 1423 (2007) (citing Harvey L. Kaplan, Electronic Discovery in the 21st
Century: Is Help on the Way?, 733 PLI/LIT 65, 67 (2005)); see also Pocket Guide, supra
note 2, at 3 (citing Microsoft, Survey Finds Workers Average Only Three Productive
Days Per Week, (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2005/mar05
/0315ThreeProductiveDaysPr.mspx) (“[The] average employee sends or receives about
50 messages per working day”).

2
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[2]
Not surprisingly, then, in the last several years discovery has
increasingly focused on e-mail and other ESI. 7 Where electronic
discovery was once present “only in large cases involving sophisticated
entities, it is now seen in routine civil cases and in many criminal cases.” 8
Relatedly, the costs associated with e-discovery have continued to
increase. 9 For instance, as of 2009 one leading e-discovery consultant
estimated that overall industry costs would grow 20% over the previous
year and exceed $4 billion. 10
[3]
In an individual matter, the “effort and expense associated with
electronic discovery [is] so excessive that, regardless of a case’s merits,
settlement is often the most fiscally prudent course.” 11 Indeed, “[o]ne
purpose of discovery—improper and rarely acknowledged but pervasive—
is: ‘it makes one’s opponent spend money.’” 12 ESI exacerbates the
7

See Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 1 (“In the past decade, discovery involving wordprocessed documents, spreadsheets, e-mail, and other [ESI] has become more routine. . .
.”).
8

Id.

9

John Bace, Cost of E-Discovery Threatens to Skew Justice System, GARTNER RES., Apr.
20,
2007,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.akershaw.com/Documents/co
st_of_ediscovery_threatens_148170.pdf (“The volumes and costs associated with
meeting e-discovery requests are rising precipitously.”); see also The Sedona Conference,
The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (Supp.
2009) [hereinafter Cooperation Proclamation] (“The costs associated with adversarial
conduct in pre-trial discovery have become a serious burden to the American judicial
system. This burden rises significantly in discovery of [ESI].”).

10

Jason Krause, EDD Providers Adapt to a Down Economy, L. TECH. NEWS, Oct. 12,
2009 (citing George Socha, a producer of the Socha-Gelbmann industry survey in 2009).

11

John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 550 (2010); see also Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9,
at 2 (“[Discovery costs] often overshadow efforts to resolve the matter itself.”).
12

Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting
BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK § 4.5, 115-16
(2010)).

3
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impact of this improper purpose. 13 Corporate defendants largely bear the
expense of such abusive discovery tactics, particularly in complex
litigation such as class actions in which their conduct is the “focus of the
litigation.” 14
[4]
With the increasing prevalence and cost of e-discovery, there has
been a corresponding rise in ESI-related disputes. 15 Such disputes and
their inherent expense can lead to decisions based on “questions of process
rather than merit.” 16 Indeed, “e-discovery has become more than merely a
discovery process; it has become an alternate method of trying a
lawsuit.” 17 Perhaps predictably, given that they more often respond to
discovery requests, rather than initiate them, “[d]efendants are sanctioned
for e-discovery violations nearly three times more often than plaintiffs.” 18
But, sanctions can be equal opportunity destroyers: while in aggregate

13

Id. at 849-50 (“[V]ast and ever-expanding volume of [e-mails] has made the cost of
discovery soar.”).
14

Id. (noting adverse “asymmetry . . . [that] there is far more evidence that plaintiffs may
be able to discover in defendants’ records . . . than vice versa”).
15

Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9, at 1 (“In addition to rising monetary costs,
courts have seen escalating motion practice, overreaching, obstruction, and extensive, but
unproductive discovery disputes . . . .”).
16

Bace, supra note 9, at 1; Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining that
discovery disputes may preclude “adjudication on the merits altogether”); Larry H.
Kunin, Appreciate the New Merits of E-Discovery, DAILY REPORT, Jan. 26, 2009, at 1
(“[T]he quest for examination of all ESI and/or sanctions . . . is often leading to improper
discovery requests and runaway litigation costs.”).
17

Kunin, supra note 16, at 2; see In re Ebay Seller Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-01882 JF
(RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75498, *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007) (noting motion for
interim preservation order related “solely to ‘discovery about discovery’”).
18

Dan H. Willoughby et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60
DUKE L.J. 789, 803 (2010).

4
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defendants have suffered more for ESI-related discovery abuses, a number
of plaintiffs have also paid the price. 19
[5]
Effective December 1, 2006, Congress amended the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in an attempt to “deal with the most basic problems
associated with the discovery of [ESI].” 20 After five years of case law
interpreting the amendments, some trends are evident 21—unfortunately,
these trends increasingly conflict with Rule 1’s mandate that the Federal
Rules be “administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action . . . .” 22 This article will examine the impact
of the amendments on the discovery of ESI and assess whether they have
been effective in dealing with the “basic problems” of such discovery. 23
[6]
The article will begin with a discussion of significant preamendment decisions relating to the preservation and production of ESI. 24
It will then assess the recent amendments to the Federal Rules and how
these have affected parties’ discovery obligations. 25 The article will focus
on key issues that have arisen in the five years the amendments have been
in effect, such as the duty to preserve ESI and when it arises, the scope of
19

See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs.,
LLC, No. 05 Civ. 9016 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4546 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010).
This phenomenon has led some commentators to divide the world into “data requesters
versus data producers,” as opposed to plaintiffs or defendants. Symposium, Managing
Electronic Discovery: Views From the Judges, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4 (2007)
(comments by Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal).
20

Bace, supra note 9, at 2.

21

See infra Section IV.

22

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

23

Bace, supra note 9, at 2.

24

See infra Section II.

25

See infra Section III.

5
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the preservation duty and the form of production, including privilege
issues, and the sanctions that have been awarded based on the failure to
preserve and produce relevant ESI. 26 Finally, the article will discuss a
critical emerging issue related to the methodology for identifying and
locating ESI, namely the sufficiency of keyword searches versus various
other alternatives. 27 Given the need for expert involvement and the
associated increase in cost, combined with the real world limitations on
the ability of cooperation to control costs, the article concludes that it
remains an open question whether the benefits of expanded e-discovery
under the amended Federal Rules outweigh the burdens on the civil justice
system. 28
II.

KEY PRE-AMENDMENT DECISIONS REGARDING THE
PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF ESI

[7]
While commentators have viewed the amendments to the Federal
Rules as ushering in a sea change in discovery, 29 in reality, case law
before 2006 increasingly recognized the discoverability of, and the
corresponding duty to preserve, ESI. 30 Thus, a number of the significant
26

See infra Section IV.

27

See infra Section IV.D.

28

See infra Section V.

29

E.g. Sharon Nelson & John Simek, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: An ESI
Primer, 32 NO. 8 LAW PRAC. 23, 25 (2006).
30

See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Minn.
2002) (“It is a well accepted proposition that deleted computer files, whether they be emails or otherwise, are discoverable.”); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C.
2001) (“During discovery, the producing party has an obligation to search available
electronic systems for the information demanded.”); Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon,
Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (noting “computer records, including records
that have been ‘deleted,’ are documents discoverable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34”); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. Civ. A. No. 69-C-58-D, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16355, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (“The law is clear that data in computerized form is
discoverable even if paper ‘hard copies’ of the information have been produced, and that

6
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issues that have arisen under the revised Federal Rules, such as the duty
and scope of preservation, cost-shifting, and spoliation sanctions,
originated in pre-amendment cases. 31
A.

Rowe—Cost-Shifting Factors

[8]
In one leading early e-discovery case, Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v.
The William Morris Agency, Inc., certain defendants sought a protective
order against the production of e-mail stored on backup tapes. 32
Reasoning that “[e]lectronic documents are no less subject to disclosure
than paper records,” 33 the court denied the requested protective order. 34
[9]
The court further recognized, however, that “discovery is not just
about uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the

the producing party can be required to design a computer program to extract the data
from its computerized business records, subject to the Court’s discretion as to the
allocation of the costs of designing such a computer program.”); Bills v. Kennecott Corp.,
108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (“[N]ow axiomatic that [ESI] is discoverable,” if
relevant); Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 222 (W.D. Va. 1972) (granting
motion to compel payroll records in “the appropriate computerized form”).
31

See infra Section II.A-III.

32

Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y
2002). The plaintiffs were concert promoters who alleged defendants used discriminatory
and anti-competitive practices to prevent plaintiffs from promoting certain events. Id.
33

Id. at 428; see also Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D.
Cal. 1999); Daewoo Elec. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1986).
34

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433. Defendants argued the e-mail was not likely to yield relevant
information because any such significant communications would have been printed out
and placed in appropriate files, which had already been provided to plaintiffs. Id. at 428.
The court rejected this contention, noting studies that conclude one-third of all e-mail is
never printed out. Id.

7
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parties can afford to disinter.” 35 Thus, on the “more difficult issue” 36 of
who should pay for the production, the court ordered that plaintiffs would
bear the cost. 37 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the parties’
competing bright-line rules, which each suggested that the other should
pay. 38
[10] Plaintiffs contended the “responding party should bear the costs of
producing electronic data since ‘if a party chooses an electronic storage
method, the necessity for a retrieval program is an ordinary and
foreseeable risk.’” 39 Noting the principle relied on by the plaintiffs did
“not translate well into the realm of electronic data,” the court recognized
that because storage costs for ESI “are virtually nil,” there could simply be
“no compelling reason to discard it.” 40 Likewise, the court reasoned that
35

Id. at 423. According to the court, the case illustrated how “discovery expenses
frequently escalate when information is stored in electronic form.” Id. In particular, the
court recognized the “expense of locating and extracting [the] responsive e-mails is
substantial . . . .” Id. at 428. Indeed, while disputed by plaintiffs, each defendant put on
evidence that the production costs would range from the tens of thousands of dollars to
almost $9.75 million for a single defendant. Id. at 425-28.
36

Id. at 428.

37

Id. at 432-33. The court recognized that to prevent “undue burden or expense,” it could
“[shift] some or all of the costs of the production to the requesting party.” Id. at 428. But
traditionally, the “presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests . . . .” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 358 (1978).

38

Id. at 429.

39

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig.,
Nos. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) and
Daewoo Elec. Ltd. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986) (“The
normal and reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable by the discovering
party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a respondent in the absence of a
showing of extraordinary hardship.”)).
40

Id.

8
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even when subject data is retained for “limited [business] purposes, it is
not necessarily amenable to discovery.” 41 In particular, according to the
court, “[b]ack-up tapes . . . ‘are not archives from which documents may
easily be retrieved. The data on a backup tape are not organized for
retrieval of individual documents or files, but for wholesale, emergency
uploading onto a computer system.’” 42
[11] Similarly, the court rejected defendants’ argument that the
requesting party should bear the expense. 43 Defendants contended that
“when the costs of discovery are internalized, [the requesting] party can
perform a cost-benefit analysis and decide whether the effort is
justified,” 44 making cost-shifting appropriate. According to the court, this
position failed for two reasons: (1) it conflicted with the “well-established
legal principle . . . that the responding party will pay the expenses of
production”; and (2) it could “result in the abandonment of meritorious
claims by litigants too poor to pay for necessary discovery.” 45
[12] In lieu of applying a bright-line rule, the court balanced eight
different factors: (1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the
likelihood of discovering relevant information; (3) the availability of the
information elsewhere; (4) the purposes for which the responding party
maintains the subject data; (5) the relative benefit to the parties of
obtaining the information; (6) the total cost of the production; (7) the
relative ability and incentive of each party to control costs; and (8) each
party’s resources. 46 Finding that the factors “tip[ped] heavily in favor of
41

Id.

42

Id. (quoting Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation, SF97 ALI-ABA 1079, 1085 (2001)).

43

Id.

44

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429.

45

Id.; see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).

46

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 429.

9
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shifting” 47 the production costs to plaintiffs, the court noted the requests
were “extremely broad,” 48 the overall expense was “substantial by any
definition,” 49 and plaintiffs were best situated to control the costs. 50
[13] Further, the court reasoned that the concept of “marginal utility”
favored shifting the costs to plaintiffs. 51 That is, while a broad search of
the subject e-mails should not be precluded altogether, the court assessed
there had “certainly been no showing that the e-mails [were] likely to be a
gold mine.” 52 Thus, because the “marginal value of searching the e-mails
[was] modest at best,” this factor supported shifting the cost to plaintiffs. 53
Likewise, the “absence of any benefit to the defendants” from the
production justified cost-shifting. 54
[14] In addition, the court noted there was no evidence defendants ever
accessed “either their back-up tapes or their deleted e-mails in the normal
47

Id. at 432.

48

Id. at 430. According to the court, “[w]here a party multiplies litigation costs by
seeking expansive rather than targeted discovery, that party should bear the expense.” Id.
49

Id. at 431. Where the “total cost of the requested discovery is not substantial, . . . there
is no cause to deviate from the presumption that the responding party will bear the
expense.” Id.
50

Id. at 432 (recognizing it is “more efficient to place the burden on the party that will
decide how expansive the discovery will be”).
51

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at, 430.

52

Id.

53

Id.; see McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[The] more likely it is
that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer
it is that the [responding party] search at its own expense. The less likely it is, the more
unjust it would be to make [the responding party] search at its own expense. The
difference is ‘at the margin.’”).
54

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431 (“Where the responding party itself benefits from the
production, there is less rationale for shifting costs to the requesting party”).

10
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course of business . . . .” 55 Thus, as “a party would not be required to sort
through its trash to resurrect discarded paper documents,” in the court’s
view it likewise would “not be obligated to pay the cost of retrieving
deleted e-mails.” 56
[15] The court established a protocol for production, which the parties
were free to modify by agreement. 57 Interestingly, the protocol contained
essentially a clawback provision to deal with the inadvertent production of
privileged documents, an issue which was later addressed in the
amendments to the Federal Rules. 58
B.

Zubulake I—Cost-Shifting Factors Revised

[16] On the heels of Rowe 59 came Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake I), which built upon and somewhat modified the Rowe
principles, resulting in a series of landmark e-discovery rulings. In
55

Id. at 431.

56

Id. But see id. at 430-32. The remaining factors were more of a mixed bag. For
instance, the court concluded there was no showing the e-mails in question were
“generally available other than by a search of the defendants’ hard drives or back-up
tapes,” which supported defendants’ bearing the cost of the production. Id. at 430. The
court further determined the relative resources of the parties to be neutral. Id. at 432.
57

Id. at 433. Plaintiff’s counsel was required to create a search procedure to identify
responsive e-mails and notify “defendants’ counsel of the procedure chosen, including
any specific word searches.” Defendants could object to any search proposed. Id.
58

Id. at 433. The protocol anticipated that a privilege review of the e-mails would not
occur until after plaintiffs ran the search and identified any documents they considered
responsive. Any defendant that elected to review its database prior to production had to
do so at its own cost. See infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text for further
discussion of such “clawback” provisions.
59

The Rowe ruling was issued by U.S. Magistrate Judge Francis. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at
423. Plaintiffs objected to the ruling and moved to set aside the portion of the order
shifting costs. Their motion was denied. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. The William Morris
Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8272 (RPP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8308, at *3, *32-33
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2002).

11
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Zubulake I, plaintiff alleged various claims arising out of gender
discrimination and retaliation. 60 She contended “key evidence” existed in
e-mails contained only on backup tapes. 61 In opposition to plaintiff’s
motion to compel production of the e-mails, defendants argued that
restoring them would cost approximately $175,000 and thus be unduly
burdensome. 62
[17] The court began by noting that like paper records, electronic
documents are subject to discovery, including those “documents that may
have been deleted and now reside only on backup disks.” 63 Thus, plaintiff
was entitled to discovery of the subject e-mails as long as they were
relevant, which the court found they clearly were. 64 Turning to the issue
of cost-shifting, the court rejected the notion that “cost-shifting must be
considered in every case involving the discovery of electronic data . . . .” 65
60

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
The court characterized plaintiff’s claims as “certainly not frivolous,” noting one
“smoking gun” piece of evidence that had already been discovered: “an e-mail
suggesting that she be fired ‘ASAP’ after her EEOC charge was filed, in part so that she
would not be eligible for year-end bonuses.” Id. at 311, 312 n.8. Indeed, plaintiff
ultimately won a verdict totaling $9.1 million in compensatory damages, plus $20.1
million in punitive damages. Eduard Porter, UBS Ordered to Pay $29 Million in Sex Bias
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2005, at C4.
61

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311-12. “[E]-mail was an important means of
communication at [the defendant’s workplace] during the relevant time period,” with
each salesperson receiving approximately 200 e-mails a day. Id. at 313-14. While
defendant initially produced approximately 100 pages of e-mail messages, plaintiff
herself produced approximately 450 pages. Id. at 313. The e-mails in dispute were
stored on 94 backup tapes. Id. at 317.

62

Id. at 312. While defendant claimed that its production was “complete,” it obviously
had not searched for responsive e-mails on any of the backup tapes. Id. at 313, 317
(“[Defendant] cannot represent that it has produced all responsive e-mails.”).
63

Id. at 317.

64

Id.

65

Id.

12
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Rather, according to the court, any “principled approach to electronic
evidence must respect” the presumption that the responding party bears
the expense of answering discovery requests. 66 The court admonished that
“cost-shifting may effectively end discovery, especially when private
parties are engaged in litigation with large corporations.” 67 Accordingly,
the court concluded that “cost-shifting should be considered only when
electronic discovery imposes an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the
responding party.” 68 A burden or expense is undue when it “‘outweighs
its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving
the issues.’” 69
[18] Continuing, the court reasoned that whether “production of
documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether
it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format (a distinction that
corresponds closely to the expense of production).” 70 And the question of
whether “electronic data is accessible or inaccessible turns largely on the
media on which it is stored.” 71 To illustrate, the court discussed five
categories of data and their storage: (1) active, online data; 72 (2) near-line
66

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317; see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
358 (1978).
67

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317-18 (“[F]requent use of cost-shifting will have the effect
of crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases.”).
68

Id. at 318. The court characterized the assumption that an “undue burden or expense
may arise simply because electronic evidence is involved” as “mak[ing] no sense.” Id.
69

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)).

70

Id. at 318.

71

Id.

72

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. The prototypical example of online data is information
on hard drives. Id.

13
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data; 73 (3) offline storage/archives; 74 (4) backup tapes; 75 and (5) erased,
fragmented or damaged data. 76 According to the court, the “first three
categories are typically identified as accessible, and the latter two as
inaccessible.” 77 The distinction between the two categories “is easy to
appreciate. Information deemed ‘accessible’ is stored in a readily usable
format . . . . ‘Inaccessible’ data, on the other hand, is not readily usable.” 78
[19] Applying these principles, the court concluded the e-mails on the
ninety-four backup tapes were not “currently accessible.” 79 Because
defendant would have to engage in a “costly and time-consuming process”
to search the subject e-mails, the court found it “appropriate to consider
cost-shifting.” 80 The court recognized that the Rowe eight factor test had
“become the gold standard” for cost-shifting analysis. 81 Nonetheless, the

73

Id. at 318-19. Optical disks are good examples of near-line data storage devices. Id.

74

Id. at 319. Offline data “lacks ‘the coordinated control of an intelligent disk
subsystem,’” and is often referred to as “JBOD (‘Just a Bunch of Disks’).” Id.

75

Id. at 319. Data on backup tapes “are not organized for retrieval of individual
documents or files . . . .” Id.

76

Id. Erased data “can only be accessed after significant processing.” Id.

77

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319-20.

78

Id. at 320. The court noted the “accessible/inaccessible test employed” by it was “very
similar” to the “active data” versus “residual data,” i.e., “deleted, shadowed, [or]
fragmented” data, distinction drawn by the Sedona Conference. Id. at 320 n.61.
79

Id. at 320.

80

Id.

81

Id.
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court found the Rowe test was “incomplete” 82 and, as a result, “generally
favor[ed] cost-shifting.” 83
[20] First, the court noted that Rule 26 “requires consideration ‘of the
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues.’” 84 But Rowe made “no mention of either the amount
in controversy or the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.” 85
The court thus concluded these factors “should be added” to balance out
the “Rowe factor that typically weighs most heavily in favor of costshifting, ‘the total cost associated with production.’” 86
[21] Next, the court reasoned that the “absolute wealth of the parties is
not the relevant factor.” 87 Thus, Rowe’s reference to the “resources
available to each party” was immaterial, according to the court. 88 Instead,

82

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 320. In addition, the court was troubled by the fact that
“courts have given equal weight to all of the [Rowe] factors, when certain factors should
predominate.” Id.

83

Id. As evidence, the court noted that “of the handful of reported opinions that apply
Rowe or some modification thereof, all of them have ordered [cost-shifting].” Id.; see,
e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 99-3564 Section “T”(1), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3196 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002).
84

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)).

85

Id. at 321.

86

Id. As the court noted, while production costs are typically “objectively large” in any
case where cost-shifting is an issue, that cost when compared to the “amount in
controversy” may shed revealing light on the significance of the discovery in the context
of the overall litigation. Id. For instance, a “response to a discovery request costing
$100,000 sounds (and is) costly, but in a case potentially worth millions of dollars, the
cost of responding may not be unduly burdensome.” Id.
87

Id.

88

Id.
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the “focus should be on the total cost of production as compared to the
resources available to each party.” 89
[22] Finally, the court considered the “‘importance of the issues at stake
in the litigation’ . . . a critical consideration, even if rarely invoked.” 90 To
illustrate, in the court’s view “if a case has the potential for broad public
impact, then public policy weighs heavily in favor of permitting extensive
discovery.” 91
[23] The court furthered its modification of Rowe by eliminating two
factors. 92 First, the court deleted Rowe’s reliance on “the specificity of
the discovery request,” considering this to be essentially redundant of the
relevance and cost factors. 93 Consequently, the court settled on a factor
combining those elements, which would simply examine the “extent to

89

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321 (emphasis added). In other words, “discovery that
would be too expensive for one defendant to bear [may] be a drop in the bucket for
another.” Id. (citing defendant’s net profits of $716 million for the third quarter of 2002
alone).
90

Id.

91

Id. Of course, the question of who should bear the cost of such discovery is separate
and apart from whether the discovery should be permitted in the first place. In any event,
as examples of such “public impact” cases, the court cited “toxic tort class actions,
environmental actions, . . . social reform litigation, cases involving criminal conduct, or
cases implicating important legal or constitutional questions.” Id.
92

Id.

93

Id. In this regard, the court acknowledged that “[s]pecificity is surely the touchstone of
any good discovery request, requiring a party to frame a request broadly enough to obtain
relevant evidence, yet narrowly enough to control costs.” Id.; see WORKING GRP. ON
ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA
PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION at ii (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed.
2007) (Principle 4: “Discovery requests should make as clear as possible what electronic
documents and data are being asked for, while responses and objections to discovery
should disclose the scope and limits of what is being produced.”).
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which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information.” 94
[24] In addition, the court found Rowe’s reliance on “the purposes for
which the responding party maintains the requested data” to be “typically
unimportant.” 95 On the contrary, according to the court, “[w]hether the
data is kept for a business purpose or for disaster recovery does not affect
its accessibility, which is the practical basis for calculating the cost of
production.” 96 Thus, “[a]lthough a business purpose will often coincide
with accessibility—data that is inaccessible is unlikely to be used or
needed in the ordinary course of business—the concepts are not
coterminous.” 97 Indeed, a “good deal of accessible, easily produced
material may be kept for no apparent business purpose.” 98 But “[s]uch
evidence is no less discoverable than paper documents that serve no
current purpose and exist only because a party failed to discard them.” 99
[25] After trimming and shaping the Rowe factors, the Zubulake court
arrived at a new seven-factor test:
(1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information; (2) the availability of such
information from other sources; (3) the total cost of the
production, compared to the amount in controversy; (4) the
94

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 321-22.

98

Id. at 322 n. 68.

99

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322 n. 68. For example, data that should “have been erased
pursuant to a document retention/destruction policy may have been inadvertently
retained. If so, the fact that it should have been erased in no way shields that data from
discovery.” Id. at 322.
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total cost of the production, compared to the resources
available to each party; (5) the relative ability of each party
to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7)
the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information. 100
[26] Significantly, the court determined the seven factors should not be
weighed equally. 101 Rather, in the court’s view the “central question must
be, does the request impose an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the
responding party?” 102 The court resolved that “[w]eighting the factors in
descending order of importance” may answer this question. 103 Thus, the
court concluded that the first two factors—the extent to which the request
is tailored to discover relevant information, and the availability of such
information from other sources —“are the most important.” 104
[27] The next most significant set of factors, numbers three through
five, address “cost issues,” i.e., “‘How expensive will this production be?’
and, ‘Who can handle that expense?’” 105
Descending further in
importance, the court came to factor six: the importance of the litigation
itself. 106 Interestingly, while acknowledging that this factor “will only
rarely come into play,” the court stated that it had “the potential to
100

Id. at 322.

101

Id. at 322-23 (noting the “temptation to treat the factors as a check-list,” but
recognizing that the “test cannot be mechanically applied at the risk of losing sight of its
purpose”).
102

Id. (“Put another way, ‘how important is the sought-after evidence in comparison to
the cost of production?’”).
103

Id. at 323.

104

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323.

105

Id.

106

Id.
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predominate over the others.” 107 Factor seven—the relative benefits to
each party of the production—brought up the rear. 108 According to the
court, this factor was “least important because it is fair to presume that the
response to a discovery request generally benefits the requesting party.” 109
[28] Having established the revised cost-shifting test and the relative
weight to be accorded each of the seven factors, the court turned its
attention to the evidence needed to analyze each factor. 110 The court
criticized Rowe’s assumption that the requested e-mails were unlikely to
be a “gold mine,” 111 reasoning that “such proof will rarely exist in
advance of obtaining the requested discovery.” 112 Rather than speculating
or making assumptions, the court determined that examining a small
sample of backup tapes would “inform the cost-shifting analysis . . . .” 113
Such “tangible evidence” would reveal “what the backup tapes may have
to offer,” as well as the “time and cost required to restore” them. 114 The
court thus ordered defendant to “produce, at its expense, responsive emails from any five backup tapes selected” by plaintiff. 115 Defendant
would then provide an affidavit detailing “the results of its search, as well
107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323. In the “unusual case where production will also
provide a tangible or strategic benefit to the responding party, that fact may weigh
against shifting costs.” Id.

110

Id.

111

Id. (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430).

112

Id. In the court’s view, assumptions regarding the likelihood that relevant information
would be found led Rowe and subsequent cases to favor cost-shifting “uniformly.” Id.
113

Id. at 324.

114

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.

115

Id. The defendant was also ordered to produce at its expense all e-mails that existed
on accessible sources, i.e., on its optical disks or its active servers. Id.
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as the time and money spent.” 116 The court could then “conduct the
appropriate cost-shifting analysis.” 117
C.

Zubulake III—Cost-Shifting Applied

[29] A keyword search of the five backup tapes selected by plaintiff
resulted in 1,075 responsive e-mails. 118 Defendant deemed 600 of these
responsive to plaintiff’s document request and produced them. 119 Plaintiff
presented the court with sixety-eight of the e-mails which she claimed
were “highly relevant.” 120 In Zubulake III, the court used this “factual
basis” to perform the cost-shifting analysis under the seven factors it had
previously enunciated. 121 The court began by noting the party responding
to the discovery at issue “has the burden of proof on a motion for costshifting.” 122 Looking at the first two factors, which make up the
“marginal utility test,” 123 the court reasoned that plaintiff’s was “a
116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
“The total cost of restoring and producing responsive e-mails from the five backup tapes
was $19,003.43.” Id. at 283. Defendant estimated that the cost of further production
from the backup tapes would be $273,649.39, including $165,954.67 “to restore and
search the tapes and $107,694.72 in attorney and paralegal review costs.” Id.
119

Id. at 282.

120

Id. at 285. The court presumed the sixty-eight e-mails were “reasonably
representative” of those contained on the seventy-seven backup tapes. Id.

121

Id. at 282, 284. The court “emphasiz[ed] again that cost-shifting is potentially
appropriate only when inaccessible data is sought.” Id. at 284.
122

Id. at 283.

123

Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 284. The marginal utility test examines whether the
request is “specifically tailored to discover relevant information” and the “availability of
such information from other sources.” Id. The court emphasized that these two factors
“should be weighted the most heavily in the cost-shifting analysis.” Id.
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relatively limited and targeted request,” which uncovered “relevant” and,
indeed, “compelling” evidence. 124
[30] On the second half of the test—the “availability of the relevant
data from other sources” 125—the court reached the “unavoidable
conclusion that there are a significant number of responsive e-mails that
now exist only on backup tapes.” 126 In so concluding, the court reasoned
defendant had “previously produced only 100 pages of e-mails, but has
now produced 853 pages (comprising the 600 responsive e-mails) from the
five selected backup tapes alone.” 127 Thus, the court ruled the marginal
utility of restoring the remaining backup tapes was “potentially high.” 128
Given that defendant bore the burden on the motion, the court concluded
that “the marginal utility test tip[ped] slightly against cost-shifting.” 129
[31] The court next looked at the “cost issues” in factors three through
five—namely “How expensive will this production be?’ and, ‘Who can
handle that expense?’” 130 The court noted the stakes were well beyond the
realm of an ordinary dispute. 131 Rather, the court assumed the potential
124

Id. at 285. In the court’s view, the e-mails painted a picture of the “dysfunctional
atmosphere surrounding” plaintiff’s workplace. Id. In particular, the court noted a
“number of the e-mails complain[ed] of [plaintiff’s] behavior.” Id.
125

Id. at 286.

126

Id. at 287.

127

Id. at 286-87.

128

Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 287. None of the e-mails provided direct evidence of
discrimination. Id. at 286. Because the existence of such direct evidence remained
“speculative,” the court termed the marginal utility only “potentially” high. Id. at 287.
129

Id. at 287.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 288. In an ordinary case, a “responding party should not be required to pay for
the restoration of inaccessible data if the cost . . . is significantly disproportionate to the
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exposure to be in the “multi-million dollar” range. 132 Accordingly, the
court determined the cost of the restoration was “surely not ‘significantly
disproportionate’ to the projected value of [the] case,” and thus weighed
against cost-shifting. 133
[32] Comparing the total cost of the production to each party’s
resources, the court recognized there was “no question that [defendant]
has exponentially more resources available to it than [plaintiff].” 134 On
the other hand, it was “not unheard of for plaintiff’s [sic] firms to front
huge expenses when multi-million dollar recoveries are in sight.” 135 Thus,
in the court’s view, the resources available to each party weighed against
cost-shifting, but did “not rule it out.” 136
[33] Regarding each party’s ability and incentive to control costs, the
court concluded that plaintiff could do nothing more to “focus her
discovery request or reduce its cost.” 137 Likewise, defendant had control
over selecting which outside vendor to restore the tapes but, once that
selection was made, “costs [were] not within the control of either
party.” 138 Accordingly, the court characterized this factor as “neutral.” 139
value of the case.” Id. But, according to the court, “[w]hatever else might be said, this is
not a nuisance value case, a small case or a frivolous case.” Id.
132

Id. In fact, the court reasoned that if plaintiff prevailed, her “damages award
undoubtedly [would] be higher than that of the vast majority of Title VII plaintiffs.” Id.

133

Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 288.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 288.

139

Id.
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[34] Similarly, the court considered factor six—the importance of the
issues at stake in the case—to be “neutral” as well. 140 On the seventh and
final factor, the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information, the court noted that plaintiff stood “to gain far more than
[defendant], as will typically be the case.” 141 This factor “weigh[ed] in
favor of cost-shifting.” 142
[35] Tallying the factors, the court stressed that the outcome was “not
merely a matter of counting and adding; [the factors are] only a guide.” 143
To illustrate, the court noted that “some of the factors cut against costshifting, but only slightly so . . . .” 144 Thus, the court concluded “some
cost-shifting [was] appropriate . . . although [defendant] should pay the
majority of the costs.” 145 Acknowledging that the “precise allocation of
costs is a matter of judgment and fairness rather than a mathematical
consequence of the seven factors,” the court nevertheless held that the
factors informed its “exercise of discretion.” 146 Ultimately, the court
assigned the “lion’s share” of the restoration costs, seventy-five percent, to

140

Id. at 289. The court recognized that while “discrimination in the workplace” is a
“weighty issue,” it is “hardly unique.” Id.
141

Id.

142

Id.

143

Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 289. The court summarized that “[f]actors one through
four tip against cost-shifting (although factor two only slightly so). Factors five and six
are neutral, and factor seven favors cost-shifting.” Id.
144

Id.

145

Id. In support of this conclusion, the court recognized there was “plainly relevant
evidence that [was] only available on [defendant’s] backup tapes.” Id. Plaintiff,
however, had “not been able to show that there [was] indispensable evidence on those
backup tapes . . . .” Id.
146

Id.
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defendant, while the remaining twenty-five percent were shifted to
plaintiff. 147
D.

Zubulake IV—Spoliation Sanctions

[36] Subsequently, it came to light that certain of the backup tapes
containing the requested e-mails had been destroyed. 148 In Zubulake IV,
the court considered plaintiff’s motion for sanctions 149 arising out of this
spoliation. 150 According to the court, the questions presented involved
“how to determine an appropriate penalty for the party that caused the loss
[of evidence] and—the flip side—how to determine an appropriate remedy
for the party injured by the loss.” 151 Thus, the court addressed “both the
scope of a litigant’s duty to preserve electronic documents and the
147

Id. The court further ruled that defendant would exclusively bear any and all costs
beyond restoring the tapes. Id. at 291. According to the court, as “a general rule, where
cost-shifting is appropriate, only the costs of restoration and searching should be shifted.”
Id. at 290. That is, the “responding party should always bear the cost of reviewing and
producing electronic data once it has been converted to an accessible form.” Id.
148

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Specifically, six tapes and part of a seventh were missing. Id. at 219.
149

Id. at 215-16. Plaintiff requested three sanctions: “(a) an order requiring [defendant]
to pay in full the costs of restoring the remainder of the monthly backup tapes; (b) an
adverse inference instruction against [defendant] with respect to the backup tapes that
[were] missing; and (c) an order directing [defendant] to bear the costs of re-deposing
certain individuals” regarding recently produced e-mails. Id.
150

Id. “Spoliation is ‘the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to
preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable
litigation.’” Id. at 216 (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779
(2d Cir. 1999)). Spoliation of “evidence germane ‘to proof of an issue at trial can support
an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for
its destruction.’” Id. (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir.
1998)). The levying of an appropriate sanction for spoliation, however, is “confined to
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and is assessed on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
(quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)).
151

Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 214.
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consequences of a failure to preserve documents that fall within the scope
of that duty.” 152
[37] Before reaching the scope of the duty to preserve, the court
recognized that “a party can only be sanctioned for destroying evidence if
it had a duty to preserve it” in the first instance. 153 The court thus
examined both “when” defendant’s duty to preserve attached and “what”
evidence should have been preserved. 154 On the first question, the court
noted the “obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice
that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have
known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.” 155 Applying
this principle, the court recognized that defendant’s duty to preserve arose
no later than August 2001, when plaintiff filed her EEOC charge. 156 But
the court went further, finding that the duty actually attached in April of
2001 when all of defendant’s “key players” anticipated litigation. 157
[38] Turning to the scope of the preservation duty, the court rejected the
notion that a party must maintain “every shred of paper, every e-mail or
electronic document . . . .” 158 Consequently, as a general rule, “a party
152

Id.

153

Id. at 216. Thus, if defendant “had no such duty, then [it] cannot be faulted.” Id.

154

Id.

155

Id.; see Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126 (preservation duty arises “when a party should have
known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation”); cf. Arthur Andersen LLP
v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (Ordinarily, it is “not wrongful for a manager
to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document retention policy . . . .”).

156

Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216.

157

Id. at 217-18. Merely having one or two employees “contemplate the possibility” of
litigation does not generally give rise to a preservation duty. Id. at 217. But here, the
court reasoned that “almost everyone associated with [plaintiff] recognized the possibility
that she might sue.” Id. Because the “relevant people . . . anticipated litigation in April
2001,” the duty to preserve attached then. Id.
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need not preserve all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates
litigation.” 159 Conversely, however, “anyone who anticipates being a
party or is a party to a lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant evidence
that might be useful to an adversary.” 160 The duty to preserve accordingly
“extends to those employees likely to have relevant information—the ‘key
players’ in the case.” 161 Further, the scope of the duty encompasses “all
relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) in existence at the
time the duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant documents created
thereafter.” 162
[39] To sum up, then, “[o]nce a party reasonably anticipates litigation,
it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put
in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant
documents.” 163 This hold “does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes
(e.g., those typically maintained solely for the purpose of disaster
recovery), which may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in
the company’s policy.” 164 But, “if backup tapes are accessible (i.e.,
actively used for information retrieval), then such tapes would likely be
subject to the litigation hold.” 165 The court did draw one significant
158

Id. at 217.

159

Id. Notably, the court recognized that requiring otherwise could “cripple large
corporations, like [defendant], that are almost always involved in litigation.” Id.

160

Id.

161

Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218. The court noted that all of the missing backup tapes
belonged to key employees of defendant. Id.
162

Id. The court left to each litigant’s discretion how this preservation is accomplished.

Id.
163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id.
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exception to the foregoing: “[i]f a company can identify where particular
employee documents are stored on backup tapes, then the tapes storing the
documents of ‘key players’ to the . . . litigation should be preserved . . .
.” 166
[40] Applying these principles, the court concluded defendant had
breached its duty by failing to preserve the backup tapes in question. 167 In
determining the appropriate remedy, the court rejected plaintiff’s request
that it reconsider its earlier order on cost-shifting. 168
[41] Similarly, the court declined plaintiff’s plea for an adverse
inference instruction. 169 In doing so, the court reasoned that an adverse
inference is appropriate only when the following three elements are
satisfied: (1) the spoliator destroyed the evidence when under a duty to
preserve it; (2) the evidence was destroyed with a “‘culpable state of
mind’”; 170 and (3) “the destroyed evidence was relevant;” 171 that is, it

166

Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218.

167

Id. at 219.

168

Id. The court noted that in deciding the cost-shifting motion, it “was well aware that
certain e-mails had not been retained and that certain backup tapes were missing.” Id.
169

Id. The instruction would have directed the jury that it could “infer from the fact that
[defendant] destroyed certain evidence that the evidence, if available, would have been
favorable to [plaintiff] and harmful to [defendant].” Id. The court recognized the
obvious “in terrorem effect” and “extreme sanction” of an adverse inference, which
counseled that it “should not be given lightly.” Id. at 220.

170

Id. at 220. Counterintuitively, “ordinary negligence” may suffice to show a “‘culpable
state of mind.’” Id. (quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306
F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)).
171

Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220. When evidence “is destroyed in bad faith (i.e.,
intentionally or willfully), that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate relevance.” Id. On
the other hand, if the “destruction is negligent, relevance must be proven by the party
seeking the sanctions.” Id.
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would support a party’s claim or defense. 172 While the court concluded
defendant had a duty to preserve the backup tapes that were destroyed, and
that the destruction was at a minimum negligent, it ruled that plaintiff
failed to show the relevance of the destroyed tapes. 173 Thus, the court
deemed the requested adverse inference “inappropriate.” 174 The court did,
however, order that defendant bear plaintiff’s costs for re-deposing certain
witnesses “for the limited purpose of inquiring into issues raised by the
destruction of evidence and any newly discovered e-mails.” 175
E.

Zubulake V—Adverse Inference

[42] After conducting the additional depositions authorized in Zubulake
IV, plaintiff discovered that certain of defendant’s employees deleted
relevant e-mails from their active accounts. 176 Defendant subsequently
recovered some of those e-mails from backup tapes and produced them to
plaintiff, although long after her initial document requests, while others
were permanently lost. 177 Thus, in Zubulake V the court clarified the
obligations of both the parties and their counsel with respect to the
preservation, location, and production of ESI. 178
172

Id.

173

Id. at 220-21. Because defendant’s spoliation was not willful, plaintiff had to
“demonstrate that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the missing e-mails would
support her claims.” Id. at 221. But the court found “no reason to believe that the lost emails would” do so in those particular circumstances. Id.

174

Id. at 222.

175

Id.

176

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

177

Id. Plaintiff also presented evidence that some of defendant’s employees did not
produce documents until nearly two years after her requests. Id.

178

Id. at 424. In the court’s view, satisfying these obligations starts with the need for
effective communication: “Lawyers and their clients need to communicate clearly and
effectively with one another to ensure that litigation proceeds efficiently.” Id.
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[43] The court recognized that early in the litigation, prior to the
destruction, defense “counsel—both in-house and outside—instructed
[key] personnel to retain relevant electronic information.” 179 But the court
noted that the issuance of a litigation hold is the beginning, not the end, of
a party’s discovery obligations. 180 After the hold is issued, a party and its
counsel must “make certain that all sources of potentially relevant
information are identified” and retained. 181 Necessarily, then, counsel
“must become fully familiar” with the “client’s document retention
policies, as well as the client’s data retention architecture.” 182 In the
court’s view, this will entail “speaking with [IT] personnel, who can
explain system-wide backup procedures and the actual (as opposed to
theoretical) implementation of the firm’s recycling policy.” 183
[44] Further, counsel must communicate with “the ‘key players’ in the
litigation, in order to understand how they stored information.” 184 In order
to ensure that relevant information is preserved, the court instructed that
the litigation hold “should be periodically re-issued so that new employees
are aware of it, and so that it is fresh in the minds of all employees.” 185
Finally, it is not enough to just issue the hold—counsel also “should
instruct all employees to produce electronic copies of their relevant active
179

Id.

180

Id. at 432.

181

Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432.

182

Id.

183

Id.; see Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that counsel should inquire into
“whether the information to be discovered has been deleted or is available only on
backup tapes or legacy systems”).

184

Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432. The court noted that “[u]nless counsel interviews each
employee, it is impossible to determine whether all potential sources of information have
been inspected.” Id.

185

Id. at 433.
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files,” as well as ensure that “all backup media which the party is required
to retain is identified and stored in a safe place.” 186 While this last point
seems obvious, the court noted a “primary reason[] that electronic data is
lost is ineffective communication with [IT] personnel. By taking
possession of . . . all potentially relevant backup tapes, counsel eliminates
the possibility that such tapes will be inadvertently recycled.” 187
[45] Applying these principles, the court recognized that while
defendant’s counsel acted “reasonably” in issuing a litigation hold, they
were nevertheless “not entirely blameless” in the failure to preserve
relevant documents. 188 Primarily, the court faulted counsel for failing to
“properly oversee” defendant’s response to the litigation hold, “both in
terms of its duty to locate relevant information and its duty to preserve and
timely produce that information.” 189 At the same time, however, the court
recognized that “the duty to preserve and produce documents rests on the
party.” 190 Thus, “[o]nce that duty is made clear . . . either by court order
or by instructions from counsel, [a] party is on notice of its obligations and
acts at its own peril.” 191
According to the court, defendant’s
“employees—for unknown reasons—ignored many of the instructions that

186

Id. at 434. For an example of noncompliance, see Kier v. UnumProvident Corp., No.
02 CIV. 8781 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14522 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003).

187

Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 434.

188

Id. at 435. Specifically, the court noted that counsel “failed to communicate the
litigation hold to all key players.” Id. at 436.

189

Id. at 435. The court conceded that counsel are not required to “supervise every step
of the document production process,” but nevertheless are “responsible for coordinating
[a] client’s discovery efforts.” Id. Here, counsel failed to ensure that defendant’s
employees complied with the preservation instructions given. Id.

190

Id. at 436.

191

Id.
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counsel gave.” 192 Finding the resulting destruction of potentially relevant
information to be willful, 193 the court ruled to issue an adverse inference
instruction about the missing e-mails to the jury. 194
F.

Philip Morris—Witnesses Precluded, Monetary Sanction

[46] In United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., the court denied the
government’s request for an adverse inference. 195 Eleven of defendant’s
most senior employees failed to follow appropriate document retention
procedures, resulting in the loss of a “significant number” of e-mails. 196
While terming it “astounding” that the employees did not preserve the
documents in question, and concluding it had the “authority to impose [an
adverse inference] for a discovery violation as serious and irremediable 197
192

Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 436. Indeed, defendant deleted many e-mails “in defiance
of explicit instructions not to.” Id.
193

Id.

194

Id. at 437. A number of other pre-amendment cases involved awards of sanctions
based on destruction of electronic information. See, e.g., Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464
F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming sanction of dismissal and $65,000 fine against
plaintiff who intentionally destroyed computer files during litigation); Krumwiede v.
Brighton Assocs., LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31669, at *24-25 , *29-32 (N.D. Ill. May
8, 2006) (entering default judgment against plaintiff for intentionally destroying
computer data); Metropolitan Opera Assoc., Inc. v. Local 100, 212 F.R.D. 178, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting default judgment as discovery sanction against defendant); In
re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Practice Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 617 (D.N.J. 1997) (imposing
a $1 million sanction for failure to comply with preservation order); Wm. T. Thompson
Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1456 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (entering default
judgment based on destruction of electronic information).
195

United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2004). In
Philip Morris, the federal government alleged defendants violated the RICO statute by
allegedly deceiving the American public about the health effects of smoking. See United
States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000).
196

Philip Morris, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 24. The employees’ actions violated both
defendant’s own retention policies as well as a case management order entered by the
court. Id. at 25.
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as [defendant’s] e-mail destruction,” the court nevertheless found this “farreaching sanction . . . simply inappropriate.” 198 In particular, the court
concluded that such a sanction would be disproportionate to the offense
and thus “cast[] too wide a net.” 199
[47] The court did, however, preclude the employees who failed to
follow the retention procedures from “testifying in any capacity at
trial.” 200 In addition, the court ordered that defendant pay a monetary
sanction of $2.75 million. 201 The court termed the fine “particularly
appropriate” because it had “no way of knowing what, if any, value th[e]
destroyed e-mails had to Plaintiff’s case; because of that absence of
knowledge, it was impossible to fashion a proportional evidentiary
sanction that would accurately target the discovery violation.” 202
G.

Phoenix Four—Attorneys Sanctioned

[48] In Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Resources Corp., 203 the court
determined that the late production of certain electronic evidence did not
197

Id. at 25. The court noted that because it did not know what had been destroyed, it
was “impossible to accurately assess” the damage done.

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Id.; see also Thompson v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 93, 104 (D. Md. 1993)
(precluding defendant from relying on e-mails that were not timely produced).

201

Philip Morris, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 26. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court said that
“each such individual” who failed to comply with the retention procedures “is being
sanctioned in the amount of $250,000.” Id. at 26 n.1. But the court levied the fine
against the defendant, not the individuals themselves. Id.
202

Id.

203

Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 CIV. 4837 (HB), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32211 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2006). Plaintiff sued its investment adviser and the
adviser’s principals alleging, inter alia, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at *1-2.
Plaintiff was defendant’s sole client. Id. at *3.
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justify an adverse inference instruction. 204 Shortly before the litigation
commenced, defendants vacated their offices. 205 While defendants took
about fifty boxes of documents and two servers and computer
workstations, they left behind at least ten other workstations. 206 One of
the defendants used one of the servers in his new business. 207
[49] After suit was filed, defendants’ counsel advised them of the need
to gather and preserve both paper and electronic documents. 208
Defendants responded that they had not located any relevant electronic
documents. 209 Subsequently, one of the servers taken from defendants’
former offices malfunctioned, necessitating a service call. 210 The
repairman discovered about 25 gigabytes of data stored in a portion of the
server that was not viewable from a workstation. 211 After determining that
much of the information was relevant, defendants’ counsel produced it;
the production came several months after defendants had represented they
had produced all responsive documents. 212
[50] Plaintiff moved for a number of sanctions based on defendants’
failure to preserve and timely produce the relevant electronic
204

Id. at *22.

205

Id. at *5.

206

Id.

207

Id. at *6.

208

Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *6.

209

Id. Defendants did produce the roughly fifty boxes of documents taken from their old
offices. Id. at *7.

210

Id.

211

Id. The material was the equivalent of as much as 2,500 boxes of documents. Id.

212

Id. at *8-9.
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information. 213 First, plaintiff sought an adverse inference due to
defendants abandoning the computer workstations at their former
offices. 214 While concluding that defendants were under a duty to
preserve at the time of the abandonment, and thus were grossly negligent
in leaving the computers behind, 215 the court nevertheless found an
adverse inference inappropriate. 216 In particular, the court noted that
plaintiff had not come forward with any proof the abandoned evidence
would have supported its claim, as required for an adverse inference. 217
[51] Plaintiff also sought an adverse inference based on defendants’ late
production of the documents found on the server. 218 Here, the court
focused on defense counsel’s role in the failure to timely produce the
information. 219 Relying on Zubulake V, the court noted that counsel has a
duty to “properly communicate with its client to ensure that ‘all sources of
relevant information [are] discovered.’” 220 The duty is not “confined to a
request for documents,” but rather encompasses a “search for sources of
information.” 221
213

Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *2.

214

Id. at *13-14.

215

Id. at *15. The court, however, concluded that the gross negligence alone did not
support an inference that the discarded evidence was favorable to plaintiff, based in part
on the “upheaval in the defendants’ business.” Id.

216

Id. at *15-16.

217

Id. Indeed, plaintiff conceded that it would “never know whether there were favorable
documents” that were destroyed. Id. at *15.

218

Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *16.

219

Id.

220

Id. (citation omitted).

221

Id. at *17.
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[52] The court concluded that defense counsel “never undertook the
more methodical survey of [defendants’] sources of information that Judge
Scheindlin outlined in Zubulake V.” 222 Rather, according to the court,
defense counsel “simply accepted the defendants’ representation that . . .
there were no computers or electronic collections to search.” 223 Had
defense counsel “been diligent, it might have asked—as it should have—
what had happened to the computers [defendants] used at [their former
office.] This question alone would have alerted [defense counsel] to the
existence of the server that the defendants had taken with them from their
former office.” 224 The court emphasized that counsel’s duty was not to
“retrieve information from a difficult-to-access source, such as the server
here, but rather to ascertain whether any information is stored there.” 225
[53] Finding that defense counsel’s conduct amounted to gross
negligence, 226 the court then concluded the delinquently produced
evidence would support plaintiff’s claims. 227 Thus, plaintiff “established
the elements necessary for an adverse inference instruction.” 228 The court,
222

Id.

223

Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *17.

224

Id. at *18.

225

Id. (footnote omitted). The court’s analysis was “guided by the proposed amendments
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,” which became effective several months after the
ruling. Id. The court characterized the proposed amendments as “essentially codify[ing]
the teaching of Zubulake IV & V, of which [defense counsel] should have been well
aware.” Id. at *19.
226

Id. at *19-20. Further, the court held defendants were “at the least negligent in
carelessly representing to counsel that ‘there were no computers to search’ when they
knew that they still possessed, and were actually using at least one of,” the old servers.
Id. (alteration in original).

227

Id. at *20-21. Indeed, the court termed the documents “central” to plaintiffs’ claims.
Id. at *21.
228

Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *21.
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however, declined to award “such a severe sanction,” reasoning that
defendants had “come forward with the evidence, even if after the close of
discovery.” 229
[54] Similarly, the court denied plaintiff’s request for various sanctions
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, 230 including that: (1)
defendants be precluded from raising certain defenses; (2) defendants be
precluded from relying on certain of the late produced documents; and (3)
certain facts be deemed admitted against defendants. 231 Again, the court
concluded that since the documents were produced, albeit late, any type of
preclusion sanction was “not warranted.” 232

229

Id. In stark contrast, in Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
Inc., 2005 WL 679071, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 955 So.
2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), later proceeding at 20 So. 3d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009), defendant’s failure to preserve and search backup tapes led to a large number of
relevant e-mails being irretrievably lost in a suit alleging fraud in a corporate acquisition.
The failure to preserve evidence was exacerbated by defendant’s and “its counsel’s lack
of candor [which] frustrated the court and opposing counsel’s ability to be fully and
timely informed.” Id. The court ultimately found defendant had engaged in a “willful
and gross abuse of its discovery obligations.” Id. In response, the court granted a
number of severe sanctions, including rendering a partial default judgment, and ordering
that (1) defendant would bear the burden of proving it lacked knowledge of the alleged
fraud; and (2) allowing the jury to derive whatever inferences it chose from the facts
related to defendant’s discovery failures. Id. at *7-8. Not surprisingly, the jury
ultimately returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of
approximately $1.6 billion. See Susan Beck, Morgan Stanley’s Recipe for Disaster,
CORPORATE COUNSEL (ALM), June 5, 2006.
230

Rule 37 provided: “A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose
information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery
as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as
evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so
disclosed.” Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *23 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
37(c)(1) (2003)).
231

Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *25.

232

Id. at *26.
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[55] The court then addressed plaintiff’s request for monetary
sanctions. 233 Noting that defendants’ late production “severely disrupted
the progress of th[e] litigation,” the court concluded that “monetary
sanctions w[ould] most appropriately serve the prophylactic, punitive, and
remedial purposes of discovery sanctions.” 234 Thus, the court ordered that
defendants reimburse plaintiff for its costs and attorney’s fees associated
with bringing the motion. 235 Interestingly, this sanction was also levied
against defense counsel; that is, the sanction was to “be borne by the
[defendants] and [defense counsel] equally, and not by the [d]efendants’
insurance carriers.” 236
III.

DECEMBER 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES

[56] With this background, it is now useful to examine the 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with ediscovery. As noted earlier, in recent years the increasing prevalence of
electronic information has led to a corresponding increase in e-discovery
disputes. 237 Enacted in 1970, however, the prior version of the Federal
233

Id. at *27. In this regard, the court noted that even when it “denies other requested
relief, it may still impose monetary sanctions for spoliation and other discovery
misconduct.” Id.

234

Id. at *28.

235

Id. at *28-29. The court also ordered that defendants and their counsel pay $10,000
each for the re-depositions of three witnesses for “the limited purpose of inquiring into
issues raised by the documents recovered from the server.” Id. at *29. Ultimately, the
court awarded plaintiff $45,161.82 in fees and costs. Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic
Resources Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006).
236

Phoenix Four, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32211, at *29. The court did not identify the
basis of its authority to sanction defense counsel in addition to defendants. Id. Notably,
“Rule 37(c)(1) does not permit sanctions against counsel.” Grider v. Keystone Health
Plan Central, Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 141 (3d Cir. 2009); Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462,
470 (7th Cir. 2003); Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir.
1988).
237

See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005) at 23,
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Rules did not contemplate the subsequent increasing importance of ediscovery. 238 Thus, prior to the amendments to the Federal Rules, courts
tended to resolve disputes about such discovery on an ad hoc basis. 239
Correspondingly, various disparate state and local rules 240 were created to
fill the “gap between existing discovery rules and practice . . . .” 241 Given
the likelihood of inconsistency and confusion resulting from “a patchwork

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf,
[hereinafter STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT], (“[D]iscovery of [ESI] is becoming more
time-consuming, burdensome, and costly.”); supra Section II.
238

Id. Prior to the amendments, Federal Rules provided “inadequate guidance” on ediscovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes (“[As] originally adopted, Rule
34 focused on discovery of ‘documents’ and ‘things.’ In 1970, Rule 34(a) was amended
to include discovery of data compilations, anticipating that the use of computerized
information would increase. [But] [s]ince then, the growth in [ESI] and in the variety of
systems for creating and storing such information has been dramatic.”); Symposium,
Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *5 (“It was time to bring the discovery
rules more in line with the demands of modern practice.”).
239

See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237, at 23 (“Developing case law on
discovery into [ESI] under the current rules is not consistent and is necessarily limited by
the specific facts involved.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes (Under the
prior version of Rule 34, “[l]awyers and judges interpreted the term ‘documents’ to
include [ESI] because it was obviously improper to allow a party to evade discovery
obligations on the basis that the label had not kept pace with changes in information
technology. But it has become increasingly difficult to say that all forms of [ESI], many
dynamic in nature, fit within the traditional concept of a ‘document.’”); Myles V. Lynk,
et al., Panel Discussion: Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 119, 120 (Oct. 2004) (noting that prior to
amendments to Federal Rules, there was “no national uniformity in [the] emerging area
of electronic discovery”); supra Section II.
240

See Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 1 & n.1 (listing local rules addressing e-discovery);
Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 13, ¶ 3 & nn.9-10 (2006).
241

See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237, at 23 (noting that a number of
courts were considering adopting local rules prior to the amendments to the Federal
Rules).
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of rules and requirements,” 242 the amendments to the Federal Rules sought
to bring uniformity by specifically providing processes for the discovery
of ESI. 243
[57] In sum, the amendments provide that like other relevant
information, ESI is discoverable; parties must preserve and, if otherwise
discoverable, produce ESI; counsel must understand ESI procedures; and
courts will have the means to address difficulties, through cost-shifting
and other means. 244 The specific amendments, which affected Rules
16(b), 26(a), 26(b)(2), 26(b)(5), 26(f), 33, 34(a), 34(b), 37(f), and 45, as
well as Form 35, are briefly summarized infra. 245
A.

Early Attention to ESI—Rules 16(b) and 26(f)

[58] As amended, in connection with the initial planning session and
subsequent scheduling order, Rules 16(b) and 26(f) require the parties to
242

Id. at 23-24 (recognizing the “costs of complying with unclear and at times vague
discovery obligations, which vary from district to district in ways unwarranted by local
variations in practice, are becoming increasingly problematic”).
243

See id. at 23 (noting need for “national rules adequate to address the issues raised by
electronic discovery”); Allman, supra note 240, at *1 (explaining that the amendments
resulted from a “conviction that e-discovery presents unique issues requiring uniform
national rules”).
244

See Craig Ball, Hitting the High Points of the New E-Discovery Rules, LAW PRACTICE
TODAY, Oct. 2006, at 2 (“ESI is discoverable; Clients must preserve and produce ESI;
Lawyers must understand how to request, protect, review and produce ESI; The courts
have the tools to rectify abusive or obstructive electronic discovery”).
245

Effective December 1, 2007, the Federal Rules were revised to reflect stylistic
changes. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION OF THE
FEDERAL
RULES
OF
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
at
v,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Prelim_draft_proposed_pt1.pd
f. No substantive changes were intended by these amendments, as they were “intended to
be primarily stylistic only.” Id. For clarity of reference, this article will discuss the
versions of the Rules effective as of December 1, 2007.
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confer early on regarding ESI. 246 New Rule 26(f) provides that the
parties’ discovery plan must address “any issues about disclosure or
discovery of [ESI], including the form or forms in which it should be
produced”. 247 Thus, at their initial meet and confer the parties should
discuss not only the basic question of whether there will be discovery of
ESI and what types of such information each party has, but also “whether
the information to be discovered has been deleted or is available only on
backup tapes or legacy systems; the anticipated schedule for production
and the format and media of that production; the difficulty and cost of
producing the information and reallocation of costs, if appropriate; and the
responsibilities of each party to preserve ESI.” 248 As per Zubulake, 249 for
the meet and confer to be effective “attorneys must be familiar with how
their clients use computers on a daily basis and understand what

246

See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237, at 26 (noting that under the new
Rule 26(f), “the parties’ conference is to include discussion of any issues relating to
disclosure or discovery of [ESI]”); Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 4 (noting parties
“should address ESI in the earliest stages of the litigation, and judges should encourage
them to do so”). Unless exempted from the initial disclosure requirements, the “parties
must confer as soon as practicable—and in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling
conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(f)(1).
247

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C). Rule 26(f) has been called the “most important ediscovery rule . . . because it gives the parties an opportunity to reach agreement on the
‘contours’ of the civil litigation in which they are engaged and, just as importantly, agree
on what they disagree about and present their disputes for early judicial resolution . . . .”
Ronald J. Hedges, The Most Important E-Discovery Rule, L. TECH. NEWS, May 19, 2009.
248

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 4-5; see STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
237, at 26-27.
249

Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In fact, the author of the Zubulake
decisions, Judge Scheindlein, was on the drafting committee for the revised Federal
UNIVERSITY,
Rules.
Judge
Shira
Scheindlin,
Resume,
FORDHAM
http://law.fordham.edu/faculty/shiraas chiendlin.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
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information is available, how routine computer operations may change it,
and what is entailed in producing it.” 250
[59] Under amended Rule 16(b), the resulting scheduling order will
memorialize the parties’ obligations regarding the discovery of ESI. 251 In
addition, as a companion piece to Rule 26’s so-called “clawback”
provision, discussed infra, 252 the scheduling order will detail any
agreements the parties reach regarding asserting privilege or work product
claims after production of ESI. 253
B.

Initial Disclosures of ESI—Rule 26(a)(1)

[60] Initial disclosure requirements under Rule 26 have likewise been
modified in several ways. Most significantly, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) was
amended to add ESI to the voluntary disclosure requirement. 254 Thus,
without a discovery request, a party must “provide . . . a copy—or a
description by category and location” of any ESI in its possession that it
250

See Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 5. Indeed, for a “meaningful Rule 26(f) conference
[to] take place,” the attorneys involved must be adequately informed about their clients’
IT systems. Id. at 4-5 (“Attorneys need to identify those persons who are most
knowledgeable about the client’s computer system and meet with them.”). It may even
be advisable to have IT personnel present at the meet and confer. See Pocket Guide,
supra note 2, at 5; Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *15
(“Judges may actually come to require more and more that lawyers bring their IT people
to the meet-and-confer.”).

251

FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv). Form 35 has also been amended to “call for a
report to the court about the results of” the meet and confer. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory
committee’s note.
252

See infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text.

253

See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv); STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 237,
at 27 (“The parties are also directed to discuss whether they can agree on approaches to
asserting claims of privilege or work-product protection after inadvertent production in
discovery.”); Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 5.
254

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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may use to support its claim or defense, unless the ESI would be used
solely for impeachment. 255
[61] This provision does not address whether or to what extent the
inaccessibility of a particular piece of information impacts a party’s duty
to disclose. 256 The Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, which was
published before the amended Federal Rules went into effect, provides
that “parties have a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation pursuant to
disclosure, particularly when a party possesses extensive computerized
data, which may be subject to disclosure or later discovery.” 257 Left
unstated is whether this “reasonable investigation” should reach
Other commentators, however, have
inaccessible information. 258
suggested that while a party should “identify the nature of its computer
system—including back-up system, network system, and e-mail system—
as well as any software applications used to operate those systems,” the
party is not required to “attempt to search back-up systems or to retrieve
deleted files in an exhaustive effort to locate all potentially relevant
evidence as part of this initial disclosure obligation.” 259
C.

Scope of Discovery of ESI—Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2)

[62] Amended Rule 26(b) incorporates the concept of two-tiered
discovery which had already existed under the Rules, and applies it to
255

Id.; see Ball, supra note 244, at 2. Initial disclosures must be made within 14 days of
the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time is stipulated or ordered by the
court. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
256

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).

257

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.13 (2004).

258

Id. The Manual does note, however, that actual production of initial disclosures is not
required; rather, a party only has to identify relevant information and materials. Id.; see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
259

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 37A.20[2] (3d ed. 2005)).

42

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

ESI. 260 In particular, amended Rule 26(b)(2)(B) introduces the principle
of “reasonable accessibility,” 261 establishing that a “party need not provide
discovery of [ESI] from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.” 262 On a motion either to
compel or for protective order, the party refusing discovery bears the
burden of showing the information sought is not reasonably accessible.263
The party seeking the ESI “may need discovery to test the assertion that
the information is not reasonably accessible.” 264 This discovery might
include sampling information contained on the sources identified as not
reasonably accessible, inspecting those sources, or taking depositions of
persons with knowledge of the supposedly inaccessible sources. 265
260

Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *9. The first tier is
“party-managed discovery,” which requires no court order and encompasses information
that is relevant, not privileged, and—in the case of ESI—“reasonably accessible.” Id.;
see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes. The
second tier is “court-supervised discovery,” meaning that “[c]ourt approval is required
before the information can be obtained.” Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery,
supra note 19, at *9. ESI that is not “reasonably accessible” is now included in the
second tier. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
261

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). The “responding party must . . . identify, by category
or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is neither
searching nor producing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes.
262

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes
(recognizing that “some sources of [ESI] can be accessed only with substantial burden
and cost. In a particular case, these burdens and costs may make the information on such
sources not reasonably accessible.”).
263

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see Ball, supra note 244, at 3 (“[I]f an opponent objects,
your client must prove inaccessibility in court.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s
notes (“[T]he responding party must show that the identified sources of information are
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”).

264

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 8.

265

See Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *11 (“Courts are
using methods like sampling, for example, ordering parties to restore a small portion of a
back-up tape, or one of several back-up tapes, in order to see both how hard it is to get to
the information—what is the nature and extent of the forensic or other kind of work
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[63] Even if inaccessibility is demonstrated, the court may still order
discovery if the requesting party establishes “good cause.” 266 In assessing
good cause, the following factors are relevant:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity
of information available from other and more easily
accessed sources; 267 (3) the failure to produce relevant
information that seems likely to have existed but is no
longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the
likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that
cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness
of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues
at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’ resources. 268
The good cause determination is subject to the proportionality test found
in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which essentially limits discovery where the cost and
burden outweighs the potential benefit. 269

necessary to make this information accessible—and how valuable the information really
is.”).
266

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). The burden of showing good cause is on the party
seeking discovery. Id.

267

Indeed, it has been suggested that parties should “first sort through the information
that can be provided from easily accessed sources and then determine whether it is
necessary to search the less-accessible sources.” Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 8.
268

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes.

269

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). In theory, this is the case, but some commentators have
noted that proportionality limits “have not proven effective.” See, e.g., Symposium,
Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *10. Thus, the amendments also seek
to “make those proportionality limits more effective in this new area where they are the
most important.” Id.
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[64] While good cause and proportionality is established on a case by
case basis, 270 whether discovery of challenged ESI will be allowed “often
turns on the type of computer data being sought.” 271 Thus, the production
of “active data, available to the responding party in the ordinary course of
business, is most likely to satisfy the proportionality test.” 272 Conversely,
systems data, such as “when people logged on and off a computer or
network, the applications and passwords they used, and what websites
they visited,” can be more costly to produce, and consequently less likely
to satisfy the proportionality test. 273 If good cause is established, the court
“may specify conditions for the discovery,” 274 such as cost-shifting. 275

270

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“circumstances of the case” must
be considered in determining whether good cause is shown); Symposium, Managing
Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *10 (good cause determination is “case by case”).
271

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 7.

272

Id. “Active electronic records are generally those currently being created, received, or
processed, or that need to be accessed frequently and quickly.” Id. Of course, active data
is generally considered accessible. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

273

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 7. Other types of data may be even more removed
from the ordinary course of business and therefore expensive to retrieve and review, i.e.,
inaccessible. These include “offline archival media, backup tapes designed for restoring
computer systems in the event of a disaster, deleted files, and legacy data, which were
created on now-obsolete computer systems with obsolete operating and computer
software.” Id. at 7–8.
274

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

275

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“The conditions may . . . include
payment by the requesting party of part or all of the reasonable costs of obtaining
information from sources that are not reasonably accessible.”). In addition, the
“conditions may take the form of limits on the amount, type, or sources of information
required to be accessed and produced.” Id.; see Ball, supra note 244, at 3 (after good
cause is shown, party’s “recourse is to ask the court to tailor the production order to
minimize” burden).
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Clawback Provision—Rule 26(b)(5)(B)

[65] The typical volume of ESI in a given case frequently increases the
time, effort, and expense required to perform a privilege review prior to
production. 276 Indeed, given the universe of responsive information, it can
be difficult to ensure that all ESI is reviewed for privilege before
production. 277 Amended Rule 26(b)(5)(B) recognizes this increased risk
of waiver and establishes a procedure for parties to attempt to assert
attorney-client or work product privilege after ESI has been produced. 278
[66] Under this so-called “clawback” or “sneak-peek” procedure, if
information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or
work product protection, the party asserting the privilege may “notify any
party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it.” 279
After receiving notice, the opposing party must “promptly return,
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has . . .
.” 280 Further, the receiving party “must not use or disclose the information
until the claim is resolved [and] must take reasonable steps to retrieve the
information if the party disclosed it before being notified” of the privilege
276

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“[T]he burdens and costs of
accessing and retrieving the information”).
277

See Symposium, Managing Electronic Discovery, supra note 19, at *7 (“The
likelihood of inadvertent production of privileged information is greater with electronic
information than it was with paper, for [a number of reasons]: its volume, its dynamic
nature, the way in which it is stored, and the way it appears when viewed on a screen or
printed out.”); Ball, supra note 244, at 4 (parties are “fast losing the ability to review
individual items, and it’s increasingly common for privileged and non-privileged content
to insidiously mix”).

278

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

279

Id. The notice should be in writing unless circumstances dictate otherwise, such as
asserting the claim during a deposition. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes.
In addition, the “notice should be as specific as possible in identifying the information
and stating the basis for the claim.” Id.
280

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).

46

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

claim. 281 The receiving party may present the information to the court
under seal for a determination of whether the privilege applies. 282 It is
incumbent on the producing party to preserve the information until the
claim is decided. 283
[67] By its nature, the “clawback” procedure does not address the
substantive question of whether a privilege that is not asserted until after
production is waived. 284 Rather, courts “should rely on developed
principles to determine whether, and under what circumstances, waiver
results from inadvertent production.” 285 Thus, for example, “unreasonable
delay in seeking the return of privileged information may give rise to a
waiver.” 286
[68] Significantly, any agreement reached by the parties under Rules
26(f) and 16(b) regarding post-production assertions of privilege will
“ordinarily control” over contrary procedures set forth in Rule 26(b)(5). 287
The substantive law of privilege is beyond the scope of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, however. 288 Thus, while any such agreement may
bind the parties, in the absence of substantive law it may not be effective
281

Id.

282

Id.

283

Id.

284

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (“In most circumstances, a party
who receives information under such an arrangement cannot assert that production of the
information waived a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material.”).
285

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 16.

286

Id.

287

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes; see Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 16.
It should be noted that the court is not authorized to “require the parties to enter into such
an arrangement, absent their agreement.” Id. at 15.
288

Pocket Guide, supra note 2, at 15.
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against third parties in subsequent litigation. 289 Fortunately, such
substantive law has recently been enacted in the form of Federal Rule of
Evidence 502. 290 Pursuant to Rule 502, a “Federal court may order that
the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the
litigation pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is also
not a waiver in any other Federal or State proceeding.” 291 The Rule also
codifies the effect in later litigation of agreements among the parties
regarding disclosure of privileged information: unless incorporated into a
court order, such agreements only bind the parties to the agreement. 292
E.

Form of Production—Rules 33 and 34

[69] Amendments to Rule 33(d) make clear that the option to produce
business records in response to an interrogatory includes ESI. 293 Notably,
the option to produce business records applies only where “the burden of
289

See Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 235 (D. Md.
2005) (“[E]ven if [such agreements] are enforceable as between the parties that enter into
them, it is questionable whether they are effective against third parties.”).
290

President Bush signed the law enacting Rule 502 on September 19, 2008. See Pub. L.
No. 110-322, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 3537 (2008). It applies in all cases commenced after that
date and, “insofar as is just and practicable,” in all cases pending on that date. See Pub.
L. No. 110-322, § 1(c), 122 Stat. 3538 (2008). The enactment of Rule 502 has been
hailed as the “biggest event of 2008 . . . .” Cecil Lynn III, et al., E-Discovery Rulings:
2008 in Review, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009, at 1.
291

FED. R. EVID. 502(d); see, e.g., Rhoads Indus. v. Building Materials Corp., 254 F.R.D.
216 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98400
(D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008). One key emerging and often outcome-determinative issue in Rule
502 cases has been which party bears the burden of establishing waiver. Compare
Rhoads, 254 F.R.D. at 223, 227 (burden on party claiming waiver), with Relion, 2008
U.S. Dist LEXIS 98400, at *5 (burden on party asserting privilege).
292

FED. R. EVID. 502(e).

293

FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (“If the answer to an interrogatory may be determined by
examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party’s business records
(including [ESI]),” the responding party may produce the relevant records in responding
to the interrogatory).
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deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for
either party . . . .” 294 In addition, the responding party must ensure that its
opponent “can locate and identify [the business records] ‘as readily as can
the party served,’” and “must give the interrogating party a ‘reasonable
opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect’ the information.” 295 Thus,
depending on the circumstances, the responding party may be required to
“provide some combination of technical support, information on
application software, or other assistance.” 296 Indeed, it is conceivable that
the responding party may have to “provide direct access to its electronic
information system, but only if that is necessary to afford the requesting
party an adequate opportunity to derive or ascertain the answer to the
interrogatory.” 297
[70] Rule 34(a) now specifically provides that ESI is subject to
production. 298 The amended Rule does not provide a precise definition of
ESI. 299 Rather, the Rule is “expansive and includes any type of

294

Id.

295

FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s notes.

296

Id.

297

Id. Significantly, however, the amendments are not meant to “create a routine right of
direct access to a party’s electronic information system, although such access might be
justified in some circumstances.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.

298

FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (a)(1)(A). In so amending the Rule, the drafting Committee
confirmed that consistent with prior case law “discovery of [ESI] stands on equal footing
with discovery of paper documents.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes; see,
e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William
Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y 2002).
299

FED. R. CIV. P. 34; FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes. Recognizing that
the “rapidity of technological change” counseled “against a limiting or precise definition
of [ESI],” the amendment is “intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of
computer-based information . . . .” Id. Moreover, the “same broad meaning” found in
Rule 34 likewise applies to references to ESI in Rules 26(a)(1), 26(b)(2), 26(b)(5)(B),
26(f), 34(b), 37(f), and 45. Id.
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information that is stored electronically.” 300 The Rule now applies to
information “stored in any medium,” in an attempt to capture “future
developments in computer technology.” 301
[71] The requesting party “may specify the form or forms in which
[ESI] is to be produced.” 302 The responding party may object to the
requested form; if it does so—“or if no form was specified in the
request—the party must state the form or forms it intends to use.” 303 If a
request “does not specify a form for producing [ESI], a party must
produce it in a form . . . in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a
reasonably usable form . . . .” 304 The option to produce in a reasonably
usable form, however, “does not mean that a responding party is free to
convert [ESI] from the form in which it is ordinarily maintained to a
300

FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes; see Ball, supra note 244, at 1 (ESI
encompasses any “potentially relevant data that’s stored on computers, disks, tape,
gadgets, and the Internet.”).
301

FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes. As noted previously, case law since
the last amendment to Rule 34 in 1970 had frequently tried to stretch the definition of
“document” to fit ESI. See supra notes 238 & 239 and accompanying text.
302

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C). The requesting party is not required to specify the form
of production. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes. Indeed, the rule
recognizes that the “requesting party may not have a preference.” Id.
303

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D). Failure to specify the form to be used prior to production
“runs a risk that the requesting party can show that the produced form is not reasonably
usable and that it is entitled to production of some or all of the information in an
additional form.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes; see Miller v. IBM, No.
C 02-2118 MJJ (MEJ), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22506, *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2006)
(requiring plaintiff to produce e-mail with attachments physically attached or provide
specific references to enable defendant to identify which attachments belonged to which
e-mails).
304

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). If the parties cannot agree on the form for production,
they must meet and confer under Rule 37(a)(2)(B) and attempt to resolve the issue. FED.
R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes. In the event of a motion to compel, the court
has wide discretion in picking a form of production, i.e., it “is not limited to the forms
initially chosen by the requesting party, stated by the responding party, or specified in
this rule for situations in which there is no court order or party agreement.” Id.
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different form that makes it more difficult or burdensome for the
requesting party to use the information efficiently in the litigation.” 305
Thus, similarly to amended Rule 33, 306 under new Rule 34(a) a responding
party may be required to “provide some reasonable amount of technical
support, information on application software, or other reasonable
assistance to enable the requesting party to use the information.” 307 In any
event, a party is not required to produce the same ESI “in more than one
form.” 308
F.

A Safe Harbor? Rule 37

[72] Rule 37(e) has been amended to address sanctions for the failure to
produce ESI. 309 The rule now provides that “[a]bsent exceptional
circumstances,” a court may not impose sanctions based on the failure to
provide ESI “lost as a result of the routine, good faith operation of an
electronic information system.” 310 As has been borne out by the relevant
case law, 311 however, the protection provided by this supposed “safe

305

FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes. For example, if “the responding party
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it searchable by
electronic means, the information should not be produced in a form that removes or
significantly degrades this feature.” Id.
306

See supra note 296 and accompanying text.

307

FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes.

308

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii).

309

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).

310

Id. The amendment thus recognizes that the “‘routine operation’ of computer systems
includes the alteration and overwriting of information, often without the operator’s
specific direction or awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy
documents.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes.

311

See infra Section IV.A.
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harbor” 312 is far from absolute. 313 In particular, a party is protected from
sanctions only if it acted in “good faith”, which likely will turn on the
timely issuance of a litigation hold. 314 That is, the good faith requirement
“means that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an
information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that
operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it
is required to preserve.” 315
G.

Third-Party Discovery—Rule 45

[73] Amendments to Rule 45 apply the changes regarding ESI made
throughout the Federal Rules to subpoenas as well. Specifically, ESI may
now be subject to subpoena; 316 ESI not reasonably accessible need not be

312

See Symposium, Panel Discussion: Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 72 (2004) (comments by
Andrew M. Scherffius) (“[S]afe harbor is in a very general way considered to be
provisions that will protect a defendant—or a plaintiff for that matter—who has
destroyed or lost e-discovery under circumstances where they can show that their conduct
was reasonable.”).
313

See Gwendolyn Mariano, EDD Rules: The Great Debate, L. TECH. NEWS, Apr. 18,
2005, at 2 (quoting Magistrate Ronald J. Hedges that amendments “will give minimal
protection, at best, to attorneys and parties. Indeed, the amendments constitute traps for
the unwary.”).

314

FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes (“[Good faith] may involve a party’s
intervention to modify or suspend certain features of [system’s] routine operation to
prevent the loss of information, if that information is subject to a preservation
obligation.”).
315

Id.

316

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). Similarly to documents or other tangible things, a
subpoena for the production of ESI requires the responding party to “permit inspection,
copying, testing, or sampling of the materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D).
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produced, unless the requesting party can show good cause; 317 if the
subpoena does not specify a form for the production, ESI shall be
produced as it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form; 318
and, finally, if privileged ESI is inadvertently produced in response to a
subpoena, clawback provisions similar to those provided in Rule 26(b)(5)
are available. 319
IV.

KEY POST-AMENDMENT DECISIONS REGARDING THE
PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF ESI
A.

Duty of Preservation—Litigation Holds
1.

Cache La Poudre

[74] One of the critical early issues under the amended Federal Rules
was the duty of preservation and when it arose. 320 In one leading case,
Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., plaintiff accused
defendant of spoliation based on the latter’s failure, after being put on
notice of potential litigation, to “discontinue its practice . . . of routinely
eliminating e-mail and overwriting backup electronic media.” 321
Preliminary to its analysis, the court acknowledged the “challenge of
overseeing discovery at a time when potential access to [ESI] is virtually
317

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1)(D). If good cause is shown, the court may “specify
conditions for the discovery,” i.e., allow the discovery “on terms that protect a nonparty
against significant expense.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee’s notes.
318

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(1)(B). If a particular form is requested, the responding party can
object to that form. Fed. R. Civ. 45(c)(2)(B).

319

See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B) (“If information produced in response to a subpoena is
subject to a claim of privilege . . . the person making the claim may notify any party that
received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party
must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information . . . .”).
320

See infra Section IV.A.

321

Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo.
2007).
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limitless, and when the costs and burdens associated with full discovery
could be more outcome-determinative, as a practical matter, than the facts
and substantive law.” 322 Turning to the motion, the court “first
determine[d] whether the missing documents or materials [were] relevant
to an issue at trial.” 323 Finding they “self-evident[ly]” were, the court then
looked to whether defendant had a duty to preserve the materials when
they were destroyed. 324
[75] While noting the duty to preserve evidence is typically “triggered
by the filing of a lawsuit,” the court recognized the obligation may “arise
even earlier if a party has notice that future litigation is likely.” 325 Here,
plaintiff argued that a phone call and letter it sent defendant almost two
years before filing suit triggered the latter’s duty to preserve. 326 The court,
however, concluded that rather than threatening litigation, the letter
implied that plaintiff “was willing to explore a negotiated resolution.” 327
Thus, the court ruled “[u]nder the particular facts of th[e] case,”
defendant’s preservation duty did not arise until suit was filed. 328 Thus,
322

Id. at 620. In this regard, the court noted the “right to conduct discovery is not
absolute.” Id. at 619. Rather, the Federal Rules recognize several limitations on “a
party’s right to obtain discovery,” most notably when the “burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, given the needs of the case, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the issues.” Id. at 620 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)).

323

Id. at 621. The ESI in question related to a trademark dispute between the parties. Id.

324

Id.

325

Id. Given that “litigation ‘is an ever-present possibility’ in our society,” a mere
chance of a lawsuit is insufficient to trigger the duty to preserve. Id. (citation omitted);
see Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1061 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (“[L]itigation must be more than a possibility” to trigger preservation duty). The
conclusion as to whether a duty to preserve exists “must be guided by the facts of each
case.” Cache La Poudre, 244 F.R.D. at 621.
326

See id. at 621-22 (detailing the parties’ interactions over two years).

327

Id. at 622.
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the court denied plaintiff’s request for spoliation sanctions prior to that
date. 329
[76] Plaintiff also sought sanctions based on alleged discovery abuses
after the preservation duty had unquestionably arisen. 330 Although
defendant had issued a litigation hold within days after service of the suit,
plaintiff contended that certain relevant documents had not been
preserved. 331 In particular, plaintiff argued that defendant should have
contacted former employees to inquire whether they possessed relevant
documents, which defendant did not do. 332 The court declined to award
sanctions on this basis, noting that plaintiff had deposed one ex-employee,
and had not inquired into whether the person possessed any relevant
documents. 333

328

Id. at 624. “As of that date, Defendants clearly had an obligation to preserve relevant
evidence.” Id. at 622.
329

Id. In contrast, in Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., LLC v. Winbond Elecs. Corp., No.
1:05-CV-64 TS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97305, *15 (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2010), the court
held that a class action settlement in 1999 put “the entire computer and component
manufacturers industry . . . on notice of a potential for litigation regarding defective
floppy disc components . . . .” This fact, combined with a letter defendant received from
one of its customers—not the plaintiff—in 2000, led the court to conclude the
preservation duty had been triggered years before the 2005 filing of suit. Id. at *21.
Given that certain documents had not been preserved, the court granted plaintiff an
instruction allowing but not requiring the jury to “draw assumptions from the fact that
[defendant] did not preserve and has not produced evidence.” Id. at *26-27; see also
Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376-77 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (granting
sanction “instruct[ing] the jury as to the appropriate inference to draw from the absence
of evidence” where defendant’s employee failed to produce e-mail sent 10 days prior to
receiving retention instructions from counsel).
330

Cache La Poudre, 244 F.R.D. at 624.

331

Id. at 625. Plaintiff based its argument on the preservation duties set forth by Judge
Scheindlin in Zubulake V. Id. (citation omitted).
332

Id. at 626.
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[77] The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s
preservation duty encompassed conducting “‘systemwide [sic] keyword
searches.’” 334 While Judge Scheindlin suggested in Zubulake V that
keyword searches were one way to identify responsive material, the court
did not read her suggestion as an “immutable ‘obligation.’” 335 Rather, the
court recognized that in the “typical case, ‘[r]esponding parties are best
situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies
appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronic data and
documents.” 336
[78] Ultimately, the court concluded defendant failed to satisfy its
discovery obligations, primarily by failing to take independent action to
verify the completeness of its document production, and by continuing its
routine practice of erasing the hard drives of departed employees. 337
Consequently, the court awarded relatively minor sanctions in the amount
of $5,000 plus deposition costs, and ordered that defendant provide certain
additional discovery. 338 In so doing, the court rejected plaintiff’s request
for an adverse finding at trial. 339
333

Id. at 627. The court also was “not inclined to penalize a party for failing to approach
former employees in an effort to respond to ‘catch-all’ or nearly indecipherable requests
for production.” Id.
334

Id.

335

Cache La Poudre, 244 F.R.D. at 627–28 (Zubulake V should not be “interpreted so
inflexibly”).
336

Id. at 628 (citing THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at 31). The court likewise
held that defendant acted reasonably in refusing to search inaccessible backup tapes for
responsive information. Id. at 628, 632.
337

Id. at 630.

338

Id. at 638.

339

Id. at 635. The court noted that unlike the Second Circuit, the Tenth requires a
showing of bad faith, not mere negligence, to support an adverse inference. Id.; cf.
Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Mere negligence in
losing or destroying records is not enough because it does not support an inference of
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Oxford House

[79] In Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, plaintiff moved to compel
production of certain e-mails. 340 Defendant argued the e-mails in question
had been deleted and were not available. 341 Defendant further put on
evidence that the e-mails were not recoverable because its backup tapes
were overwritten every six weeks. 342 Noting the destruction occurred in
June 2005 and defendant had not been put on notice of potential litigation
until later that August, the court concluded defendant had no duty to
preserve the e-mails. 343 In other words, the destruction occurred before
defendant’s duty to preserve arose. 344
[80] The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant should
search for the deleted e-mails on the backup tapes. 345 Initially, the court
cited Zubulake IV for the proposition that even if the “backup tapes were
conclusively shown to possess the deleted e-mail communications, ‘as a
general rule, a party need not preserve all backup tapes even when it

consciousness of a weak case.”); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeporge Fin. Grp., 306
F.3d 99, 108 (“The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases
involving the negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of
its own negligence.”).
340

Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *2, 7 (D. Kan.
Apr. 27, 2007).

341

Id. at *8.

342

Id. at *11. In addition, defendant submitted an affidavit from one of its
representatives establishing that he had not received any relevant e-mails, although two
other persons apparently had. Id. at *9.
343

Id. at *11.

344

Id. at *11.

345

Oxford House, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *13-14 (noting the “small likelihood
that such efforts would be successful”).
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reasonably anticipates litigation.’” 346 Rather, inaccessible backup tapes,
such as those used for disaster recovery, generally are not subject to a
litigation hold. 347 The court concluded the backup tapes at issue were
used for disaster recovery purposes and thus were not subject to a
preservation duty. 348 In any event, the court also recognized there was no
evidence the tapes would have contained the e-mails when defendant’s
duty to preserve arose. 349
[81] Relatedly, the court agreed with defendant that searching the
backup tapes would be unduly burdensome under the circumstances. 350 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the marginal utility analysis,
assessing the likelihood the search would “produce information that is
relevant to a claim or defense. The greater the likelihood that it will, the
fairer it is to require the producing party to bear the expense.” 351 Here, the
court recognized the costs of searching the backup tapes would be high, 352
while the chances of discovering relevant information were low given

346

Id. at *12 (citation omitted).

347

Id. at *12; see also Forest Labs, Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd., No. 06-4004-RDR,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31555, *11-12, *23 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2009) (ordering hearing
to assess accessibility of backup tapes destroyed after trigger of preservation duty; if
tapes were inaccessible, then no duty to preserve existed).
348

Oxford House, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *12.

349

Id. at *11.

350

Id. at *14.

351

Id. at *14.

352

Id. at *15. Defendant argued that an initial review of the tapes would cost at least
$100,000. Id.
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defendant’s policy of continually writing over data on the tapes. 353 Thus,
the court upheld defendant’s unduly burdensome objection. 354
3.

Doe

[82] In Doe v. Norwalk Community College, the court “strongly
disagree[d]” with defendants’ contention that their duty to preserve did not
arise until “well after [plaintiff] filed her lawsuit in November 2004 . . .
.” 355 Rather, and in contrast to Cache La Poudre, the court concluded the
“duty to preserve certainly arose no later than September 2004, when
[plaintiff’s] counsel sent the defendants a demand letter . . . .” 356 In fact,
the court surmised the duty to preserve had initially arisen as early as
February 2004, when a number of one of the defendant’s employees met
to discuss certain of the allegations plaintiff ultimately raised in her suit. 357
By that time, “even if [plaintiff] had not yet filed her lawsuit, the
defendants should have known that any documents, including e-mails and
hard drives, related to [a certain defendant] could potentially be relevant to
future litigation.” 358
[83] Defendants tried to rely on Rule 37(e)’s so-called “safe harbor”
provision to excuse their destruction of electronic data after the duty to
preserve arose, arguing that any such destruction resulted from “a neutral
353

Oxford House, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *15.

354

Id. at *16. Contra Disability Rights Council v. Washington Metro., 242 F.R.D. 139,
148 (D.D.C. 2007) (ordering defendant to search backup tapes for deleted e-mails; safe
harbor provision of Rule 37(e) did not apply where defendant failed to implement a
litigation hold until over two years after suit was filed, leading to the deletion of
responsive e-mails).
355

Doe v. Norwalk Community College, 248 F.R.D. 372, 377 (D. Conn. 2007).

356

Id.

357

Id.

358

Id.
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retention system with limited resources.” 359 The court, however, noted
there was “no evidence that the defendants did anything to stop the routine
destruction of the backup tapes after [their] obligation to preserve
arose.” 360 According to the court, to avail itself of Rule 37’s good faith
exception, a “party needs to act affirmatively to prevent” the destruction of
data, such as by implementing a litigation hold. 361 Given that defendants
had not done so, the court ruled they were not entitled to the protections
afforded by Rule 37. 362 Indeed, the court found “defendants’ failure to
place a litigation hold and to preserve e-mails and hard drives relevant to
[plaintiff’s] allegations . . . to be at least grossly negligent, if not reckless,”
entitling plaintiff to an adverse inference instruction. 363
4.

Treppel

[84] Likewise, in Treppel v. Biovail Corp., the court concluded
defendants’ “efforts to preserve ESI were clearly inadequate.” 364 Plaintiff
filed suit in April 2003, leading the corporate defendant’s general counsel
in May to orally instruct key executives to preserve relevant
information. 365
The general counsel repeated the instructions in
359

Id.

360

Doe, 248 F.R.D. at 380.

361

Id. at 378.

362

Id. (citation omitted).

363

Id. at 379, 381.

364

Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 249 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

365

Id. at 115. The executives, however, could not remember when they began to preserve
information. Id. at 121; see also Acorn v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. CV 05-2301 (JFB)
(WDW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19459, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2009). Defendant
argued that it issued a “verbal hold” upon receiving service of the complaint in June
2005. But the court noted defendant had not provided an affidavit “indicating the timing
of [the attorney’s] ‘verbal hold’ or to whom she relayed it.” Id. at *8. Further, defendant
had not provided any evidence that the attorney “or anyone else . . . conducted any
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December, following a letter from plaintiff’s counsel demanding that all
relevant ESI be preserved. 366 The preservation instructions were not
issued in writing, nor did the general counsel follow up with the
executives as to what steps they took to preserve information. 367
Defendants failed to preserve backup tapes that existed in December 2003,
some seven months after the preservation duty attached. 368 The court
termed defendants’ preservation efforts “clearly inadequate,” relying on
Zubulake V for the proposition that “[c]ounsel must take affirmative steps
to monitor compliance” with a litigation hold, which failed to occur. 369
[85] On the question of remedy, 370 the court found defendants’
discovery failures “negligent but not willful,” meaning plaintiff had to
follow-up to ensure that her instructions were being followed.” Id. Thus, the court
concluded that defendant breached its duty to preserve until September 2006, when it
issued a formal litigation hold. Id. at *10.
366

Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 115.

367

Id. The general counsel also did not take any steps to ensure that employees other
than the executives preserved relevant information. Id. at 118.

368

Id. at 119. While the court recognized Zubulake IV’s general rule that backup tapes
are not required to be preserved, it went on to conclude the tapes in question should have
been saved because they “were quite likely to contain files that were later deleted.” Id.
In doing so, the court did not address the accessibility of the backup tapes, nor did it
discuss whether the defendants could “identify where particular employee documents
[were] stored on the backup tapes,” and thus seemed to go beyond the Zubulake IV
principles. Id.; see Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); cf. Oxford
House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *12
(D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007) (noting the inaccessibility of backup tapes and finding the
litigation hold did not apply).
369

Treppel, 249 F.R.D. at 118 (citation omitted).

370

Generally, a “court ‘must determine the appropriate sanction based on the relative
fault of the party against whom sanctions are sought and the prejudice suffered by the
party seeking sanctions.’ Moreover, ‘[t]rial judges should have the leeway to tailor
sanctions to insure that spoliator[s] do not benefit from their wrongdoing—a remedial
purpose that is best adjusted according to the facts and evidentiary posture of each case.’”
Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted).
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establish the missing evidence’s relevance in order to justify an adverse
inference. 371 Recognizing that plaintiff failed to do so, the court denied
the request for an adverse inference. 372 The court did, however, allow
plaintiff to conduct a forensic search of one of defendants’ laptop
computers, and ordered defendants to restore and conduct additional
searches on various backup tapes. 373
5.

Keithley

[86] One of the more striking decisions awarding sanctions for the
failure to institute a proper litigation hold is Keithley v. The Home
Store.Com, Inc. 374 In Keithley, plaintiffs argued that defendants spoliated
“three types of evidence: (1) source code; (2) early architectural, design
and implementation documents; and (3) reports.” 375 Generally speaking,
371

Id. at 122. While positing that in certain circumstances a finding of gross negligence
in destroying evidence can support an adverse inference, the court concluded
“defendants’ conduct ‘[did] not rise to the egregious level seen in cases where relevance
is determined as a matter of law.’” Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted).
372

Id. at 122-23. Indeed, the court noted there was “little extrinsic evidence
demonstrating that any pertinent documents at all were destroyed, let alone documents
favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 122.

373

Id. at 124.

374

Keithley v. The Home Store.Com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61741 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008). Preliminary to its analysis, the court noted that
it would “prefer to see [its] resources . . . directed to addressing the substantive issues of
the case . . . rather than the collateral issue of sanctions for discovery abuse . . . .” Id. at
*3-4. But the court concluded this was “the unusual case in which [d]efendants’ conduct
warrant[ed] stiff monetary, as well as evidentiary, sanctions.” Id. at *4. Indeed, the court
termed the discovery misconduct by defendants “among the most egregious” it had seen.
Id. at *3. According to the court, defendants made misrepresentations to both plaintiffs
and the court, as well as engaged in spoliation of information. Id.
375

Id. at *12. Plaintiffs contended the spoliation prejudiced their ability to prove patent
infringement related to a computerized system for tracking real estate information. See
id. at *11.
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the court recognized the duty to preserve “extends to what the party
knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably
likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the subject of a pending
discovery request.” 376 The “threshold question” in assessing spoliation
allegations, however, is “when the duty to preserve . . . arose.” 377 Here,
the court recited that a litigant must preserve evidence it knows or should
know is relevant to imminent litigation, or “probable” future litigation. 378
[87] Plaintiffs contended a July 1998 letter put defendants on notice of
the alleged infringement. 379 The court rejected this contention, as the
letter did “not threaten litigation or even mention infringement.” 380 The
court concluded, however, that the duty to preserve existed by August
2001, when plaintiffs sent defendants an unambiguous demand letter. 381
Defendants, therefore, “had a duty to preserve documents well before” the
lawsuit was filed in October 2003. 382 But according to the court, whether
the duty existed before the filing of the lawsuit was “largely academic,”
because defendants did not implement a litigation hold “even after th[e]
lawsuit was filed and [they] recklessly allowed the destruction of some
relevant source code as late as 2004.” 383
376

Id. at *13 (citations omitted).

377

Id. at *15.

378

Id. By “probable,” the court meant “‘more than a possibility.’” Id. (citation omitted).

379

Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *16.

380

Id.; cf. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 622 (D.
Colo. 2007) (involving a letter from counsel which “implied that her client . . . was
willing to explore a negotiated resolution”).
381

See Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *16. Indeed, the court noted the duty
“probably arose” by June 2001 based on another letter plaintiffs sent. Id. at *16-17.

382

Id. at *17.

383

Id.
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[88] In addition, the court stressed defendants’ concession “that there
was no written litigation hold policy in place during any of the relevant
time periods. . . . Nor was there any evidence, other than oral testimony, of
what employees were told with respect to preservation of documents . . .
.” 384 According to the court, the lack of a written “litigation hold policy
and procedures for its implementation, including timely reminders or even
a single e-mail notice to relevant employees, exemplifie[d] [d]efendants’
lackadaisical attitude with respect to discovery . . . .” 385
[89] Coupled with the lack of a litigation hold was the defendants’
“egregious failure to diligently search for responsive documents,” which,
in the court’s view, “compounded” the harm. 386 For example, defendants
“produced 480,000 files containing reports two weeks after they”
represented to the court “that no reports existed, and approximately
sixteen months after the [c]ourt ordered production of reports.” 387
Likewise, defendants produced an archive CD of some of the source code
in April 2008, after having been ordered to do so in December 2006. 388
Even worse for defendants, they apparently had not previously asked the
custodian of the CD to search for data responsive to the source code
requests. 389 Thus, the court concluded defendants “failed to adequately

384

Id. at *18.

385

Id.; see also In re NTL, Inc. Secs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(failing to implement adequate litigation holds and issuing timely reminders was at least
grossly negligent).

386

Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *19.

387

Id. at *30. The court had previously granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel, which
encompassed many of the allegedly spoliated documents. See id. at *19-22.
388

Id. at *41. Unfortunately, “evidence of prior versions of source code was destroyed.”
Id. at *34.
389

See id. at *41-42. The court was “frankly shocked” and could “fathom” no
explanation for “why the CD was not found and produced earlier.” Id.
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search for and produce” relevant documents, including reports and source
code. 390
[90]

On the issue of remedy, the court recognized the
policies underlying the spoliation sanctions are many: ‘to
punish the spoliator, so as to ensure that it does not benefit
from its misdeeds; to deter future misconduct; to remedy,
or at least minimize, the evidentiary or financial damages
caused by the spoliation; and last, but not least, to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process and its truth-seeking
function.’ 391

Cataloguing defendants’ sins—they had not issued a litigation hold, had
not adequately preserved evidence, had made material misrepresentations
to the plaintiffs and the court, and had produced an “avalanche” of
responsive information much later than when required—the court
characterized their behavior as “reckless and egregious discovery
misconduct.” 392 Nevertheless, the court declined to enter a terminating
sanction, reasoning there was “no evidence that [d]efendants engaged in
deliberate spoliation, and dismissal is the most extreme sanction and
would go beyond what is necessary to cure the prejudice to [p]laintiffs . . .
.” 393 The court did, however, order that an adverse inference instruction
390

Id. at *22. In contrast, the court declined to impose sanctions related to discovery of
the design and architectural documents. Id. at *47.
391

Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *6 (citations omitted). Under its inherent
authority, the court concluded sanctions were available “if ‘preceded by a finding of bad
faith, or conduct tantamount to bad faith,’ such as recklessness ‘combined with an
additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose.’” Id. at *7
(citing Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2001)). Rule 37 sanctions, on the
other hand, could be triggered by mere “negligent conduct.” Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61741, at *7.
392

Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *47-48.

393

Id. at *50.

65

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

be given regarding spoliation of the source code data. 394 In addition, the
court awarded plaintiffs a “sizeable monetary sanction.” 395
6.

Innis Arden

[91] In Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., plaintiff failed to
preserve soil samples and associated electronic data. 396 Indeed, neither
plaintiff nor its consultant, who gathered the samples, ever instituted a
litigation hold. 397 As a result, “all e-mail messages and draft documents
and reports were deleted after thirty days.” 398 Given there was no dispute
394

Id. at *50-51. The Keithley opinion was authored by U.S. Magistrate Judge Laporte.
Id. at *2. Defendants objected to the report. See Keithley v. The Homestore.com, Inc.,
629 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The court denied the objections, with the
exception of the adverse inference, which had been rendered moot by the grant of
summary judgment in defendants’ favor on noninfringement and invalidity. Id. at 974,
978.
395

Keithley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *54. Later, defendants moved for
sanctions based on alleged spoliation by plaintiffs. Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., No.
C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92822, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2008).
While concluding that plaintiffs had engaged in misconduct, the court concluded that the
“harsh remedy” of an adverse inference, much less terminating sanctions, would be
“disproportionate” given the facts presented. Id. at *20-21, *26, *28. Specifically, the
court noted there had been “no showing that [p]laintiffs engaged in widespread, reckless
or intentional spoliation.” Id. at *28. Consequently, the court granted defendants fees
and costs and certain additional discovery, but denied the request for terminating
sanctions or an adverse inference. Id. at *29-30.
396

Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 335, 338 (D. Conn.
2009). Plaintiff brought suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), seeking to recover costs related to
removing PCBs found on its property. Id. at 335. The samples in question were taken in
anticipation of seeking reimbursement of remediation costs from neighboring landowners
who allegedly were responsible for the contamination. See id. at 336.

397

Id. at 338.

398

Id. Likewise, “much of the original electronically stored data from the PCB analyses
was not preserved.” Id.
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the soil samples and related data had not been preserved, the court looked
to (1) whether plaintiff had a duty to preserve the materials when they
were destroyed and, if so; (2) whether sanctions were warranted by the
destruction and what type were justified. 399
[92] According to the court, plaintiff knew the soil samples were a
“critical part of possible cost-recovery litigation, and the duty to preserve
this evidence attached at the latest by mid-2005 . . . .” 400 Interestingly, the
court found the preservation duty arose even before the suit was filed. 401
Further, the court concluded plaintiff was responsible for the spoliation
even though its consultant had actually destroyed the data. 402
[93] Turning to the appropriate remedy, the court noted the “applicable
sanction should be molded to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and
remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine.” 403 In finding “no
basis on which to conclude that [plaintiff] purposefully destroyed
evidence,” the court likewise recognized “no reason [had been] offered
why it was not feasible, either logistically or economically . . . to store the
soil samples . . . .” 404 In addition, plaintiff failed to issue any litigation
hold “despite contemporaneously recognizing the potential negative
399

Id. at 339.

400

Id. at 340. In support of this finding, the court relied on plaintiff’s own documents,
including the engagement letter with its consultant, showing that “litigation was
reasonably anticipated from the very beginning of the investigation and remediation
process.” Id.
401

Innis Arden, 257 F.R.D. at 339 (“[D]uty . . . attach[es] [when] ‘a party should have
known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.’” (quoting Kronisch v.
United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998))).
402

See id. at 341 (“Courts have found that an expert’s destruction of evidence can be
attributed to its client . . . .”).

403

Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

404

Id. at 342-43.
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consequences of evidence destruction.” 405 Thus, according to the court, a
“severe sanction” was “necessary.” 406 While concluding that dismissal
was unwarranted, the court likewise reasoned an adverse inference would
be insufficient. 407 Given that the “key raw ‘fingerprint’ evidence . . .
simply no longer exists, but the party that is responsible for its destruction
seeks to benefit from its use,” the court ruled the appropriate sanction
would be to preclude any evidence based on the samples that plaintiff’s
consultant had destroyed. 408
7.

Oracle

[94] Plaintiffs in Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp. 409
contended that defendants “improperly focused” their preservation efforts
by only sending hold notices to roughly 30 of 40,000 employees. 410 The
court rejected this contention, noting “plaintiffs ha[d] not identified any

405

Id. at 342.

406

Innis Arden, 257 F.R.D. at 342. In particular, the court noted the prejudice defendant
suffered, since it could not run its own tests and analysis on samples and data that no
longer existed. See id.
407

Id. at 342-43. The proceeding was a bench trial which, in the court’s view, rendered
an adverse inference “somewhat awkward.” Id. at 343.
408

Id.; cf. Pinstripe, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., No. 07-CV-620-GKF-PJC, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66422, at *8-9, *11-12 (N.D. Okla. July 28, 2009) (awarding only small monetary
sanction and additional discovery, despite finding that defendant failed to issue litigation
hold and failed to monitor compliance with oral retention instructions, and concluding
that defendant’s conduct was not intentional).
409

Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 254 F.R.D. 559 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Plaintiffs alleged a number of securities fraud claims on behalf of a class of purchasers of
Oracle stock. See id. at 561.

410

Id. It is unclear precisely how many employees plaintiffs contended should have
received the hold notice. See id. In any event, plaintiffs did not explain how discovery
could feasibly be conducted on thousands of employees, assuming that was their goal.
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particular documents that were not preserved as a result of defendants’
preservation efforts . . . .” 411
[95] Plaintiffs also argued the preservation process was inadequate
because Oracle’s CEO, Larry Ellison, did not produce a significant
number of e-mails from his files, nor notes or transcripts of interviews he
conducted with an author on a book project. 412 Here, the court found
sanctions appropriate. 413 On the e-mail issue, the court noted defendants
only produced 15 e-mails sent or received by Mr. Ellison from his own
files, while over 1,650 of such e-mails were produced from the files of
other Oracle employees. 414 The court disagreed with defendants’
contention that plaintiffs were not entitled to receive multiple copies of the
e-mails, reasoning it “could have been helpful . . . to demonstrate that
certain e-mails were discovered in Ellison’s files; otherwise . . . Ellison
could argue that he never actually read or received an e-mail that was sent
to him, and thus had no knowledge of its contents.” 415
[96] Further, the court faulted Mr. Ellison’s production related to the
interviews for his book. 416 While certain transcript pages were produced,
411

Id. at 565. The production overall was massive, totaling some 2.1 million documents.
In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 386 (9th Cir. 2010).
412

Oracle, 254 F.R.D. at 561-62. Mr. Ellison received the hold notice. Id. at 561.

413

Id. at 565.

414

Id.

415

Id. This proposition seems dubious. Whether a particular e-mail is produced from the
alleged recipient’s files or somewhere else, the recipient could always argue that he did
not read the e-mail in question. In any event, requiring production of every recipient’s
copy of a particular e-mail contravenes the direction of Zubulake IV that a party need not
maintain “multiple identical copies” of relevant documents or “every shred of paper,
every e-mail or electronic document . . . .” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
416

Oracle, 254 F.R.D. at 566.
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many others were not, apparently because the author destroyed the
materials in question. 417 The court rejected Mr. Ellison’s argument that he
did not have possession or custody of the interview materials, noting he
had a contractual right to exercise “authority over the materials and the
ability to preserve them . . . .” 418 Given that Mr. Ellison “knew of the
litigation at the time most interviews were conducted, and failed to take
any efforts to preserve the materials despite his obligation to do so,” the
court ruled sanctions were warranted. 419 Accordingly, the court granted
plaintiffs an adverse inference regarding Mr. Ellison’s e-mails and the
interview materials related to the book. 420
8.

Green

[97] In Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., plaintiff sought spoliation sanctions
several years after losing a jury trial. 421 Defendant had a single employee
who was responsible for searching for and gathering documents relevant

417

Id.

418

Id. at 566-67.

419

Id. at 566.

420

Id. at 567. Specifically, the court ruled plaintiffs “would be entitled to an inference
that the spoliated evidence would demonstrate Ellison’s knowledge of any material facts
that [p]laintiffs could otherwise establish.” In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig, 627 F.3d 376,
385 (9th Cir. 2010). Ultimately, the court nevertheless granted summary judgment in
defendants’ favor. Id. at 395. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s
contention that the adverse inferences should have been applied to “defeat a challenge to
the insufficiency of their prima facie case.” Id. at 386.
421

Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-372 (TJW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353,
at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2011). Plaintiff’s suit involved a product liability claim alleging
that a gas can manufactured by defendant caused the death of plaintiff’s relative. Id.
Plaintiff claimed the gas tank should have contained a flame arrester; defendant
contended it did not because flame arresters are ineffective. Id. Discovery in a related
case revealed documents which plaintiff contended related to this issue and should have
been produced in her case, leading to the spoliation motion. Id. at *4-5.

70

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

to the litigation. 422 The employee, however, did “not institute a litigationhold of documents, do any electronic word searches for e-mails, or talk
with the IT department regarding how to search for electronic
documents.” 423 Consequently, plaintiff “identifie[d] numerous documents
not produced in [her] case that [were] extremely relevant and material.” 424
[98] The court found that “any competent electronic discovery effort
would have located” the documents in question. 425 Moreover, defendant’s
IT department had the “ability to do electronic word searches for e-mails,
[yet] no word search was ever done.” 426 In fact, the employee in charge of
defendant’s discovery efforts “readily admit[ted] that ‘I am about as
computer . . . illiterate as they [sic] get.’” 427 Thus, the court concluded
that defendant “made little, if any, effort to discharge its electronic
discovery obligations . . . [and] also failed to preserve its electronic
documents.” 428 Even more damning, the court found defendant “actually
asked its employees to routinely delete electronic documents,” at a time
when it was defending multiple product liability lawsuits and had a
preservation duty. 429
422

Id. at *11.

423

Id. at *14; see also In re A&M Fla. Props. II, No. 09-15173 (AJG), 2010 Bankr.
LEXIS 1217, at *20, *21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2010) (granting monetary sanction against
plaintiff and counsel where ESI was produced late due to failure to timely identify all
sources of information).
424

Green, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353, at *14. For instance, plaintiff identified
numerous documents including e-mails from discovery in another case that related to the
flame arrester issue. See id. at *14-18.
425

Id. at *20.

426

Id. at *21.

427

Id. at *20-21. As the court noted, “[t]hat [defendant] put someone in charge of its
discovery who knows nothing about computers does not help [its] effort to show that it
was reasonable in its discovery obligations.” Id. at *21 n.5.
428

Id. at *26.
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[99] Based on the foregoing, the court issued a harsh—and creative—
sanction: (1) it ordered defendant to pay $250,000 to compensate plaintiff
for losses caused by defendant’s serial discovery violations; (2) it also
gave defendant thirty days to provide a copy of the court’s order to every
plaintiff in every lawsuit pending against it and that had been pending
against it in the previous two years; (3) the court ordered an additional
$500,000 fine that would extinguish upon the defendant’s certification of
compliance with the foregoing provision; and (3) the court ordered that for
the five subsequent years, for every new lawsuit that defendant would be a
party to (whether plaintiff or defendant), it must file a copy of the court’s
order with its initial pleading or filing. 430
B.

Scope of Preservation—Reasonable Accessibility and
Proportionality
1.

Café Asia

[100] In Smith v. Café Asia, defendant moved to compel production of
certain images stored on plaintiff’s cell phone. 431 Defendant argued the
images would rebut plaintiff’s claim that he was subjected to a hostile
work environment due to his sexual orientation. 432 While recognizing the
broad scope of discovery, the court nevertheless noted that “relevancy
429

Green, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353, at *26-27. Defendant also recycled its backup
tapes every two weeks, meaning the deleted e-mails were permanently lost. Id. at *29.
Thus, the court concluded “it [would] never be known how much prejudice against the
plaintiff was actually caused by [defendant’s] failure to preserve documents.” Id.
430

Id. at *33-36.

431

Smith v. Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. 19, 19 (D.D.C. 2007).

432

Id. at 20. Plaintiff conceded that “his cell phone contain[ed] ‘intimate, highly
personal’ and ‘unclothed images’ . . . but denie[d] having willingly shared the images
with his co-workers.” Id. Defendant, on the other hand, argued that the “images [were]
relevant to whether plaintiff invited a hostile work environment and whether he was
subjectively offended by defendant’s alleged conduct.” Id.
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alone does not entitle a requesting party to carte blanche in discovery.” 433
Rather, according to the court, “[o]ne important constraint is the
admissibility of the discovery being sought.” 434 Thus, even though
information ultimately held inadmissible at trial may still be discoverable,
this “holds true . . . only if the [information] ‘appear[s] reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’” 435
[101] Accordingly, the court determined that “the question of
discoverability is inseparable from admissibility,” and thus it had to
examine whether the information’s probative value was substantially
outweighed by its unfair prejudice. 436 The court therefore ordered that the
images be preserved pending a ruling on their admissibility by the trial
judge. 437 In addition, the court ordered that plaintiff permit one attorney
designated by defendant to inspect the images so defendant could make an
informed argument regarding their admissibility. 438
2.

Columbia Pictures

[102] In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court addressed the
“following question of first impression: is the information held in a
computer’s random access memory (RAM) ‘electronically stored
information’ under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34?” 439 Defendants
433

Id.

434

Id. In this regard, the court noted “[a]s with most things in life, Rule 26 is not an allor-nothing proposition.” Id.
435

Id. at 20 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).

436

Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. at 20. For an extensive discussion of the admissibility of ESI,
see generally Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007).
437

Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. at 20-21.

438

Id. at 21.

439

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In
Columbia Pictures, plaintiffs were “motion picture studios that own[ed] copyrights or
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argued that ESI “cannot include information held in RAM because the
period of storage, which may be as much as six hours, is too
temporary.” 440 The court disagreed, finding it undisputed that
RAM is computer memory and that information held in
RAM is held there for later use by the computer (e.g., to be
used in tasks performed by software or written to a hard
drive, flash drive, DVD, or other more permanent medium)
or disposal (e.g., to be erased when the computer is turned
off or when the data is overwritten with new information as
part of the regular computing process). 441
Further, the court noted that RAM “itself is defined as a storage unit . . .
and . . . is typically used as the computer’s primary storage . . . .” 442 Thus,
according to the court, “information held in RAM is ‘stored’ under the
plain meaning of the unambiguous language of Rule 34.” 443
[103] Leaving aside the plain language of Rule 34, the court further
noted the definition of ESI was meant to “be read expansively to include
all current and future electronic storage mediums . . . .” 444 Since Rule 34’s

exclusive reproduction and distribution rights to numerous movies and television
programs.” Id. at 445. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants operated a website that
allegedly permitted “Internet users to locate and download, view, store, and distribute
unauthorized copies of Plaintiffs” works. Id. Plaintiffs sought discovery of server log
data, which included, inter alia, “the anonymous (masked or encrypted) Internet Protocol
(IP) address of users of Defendants’ website . . . .” Id. at 447 n.3. The server log data
could be copied from defendants’ computers and produced to plaintiffs. Id. at 447.
440

Id. at 446.

441

Id.

442

Id. at 447.

443

Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A) (allowing discovery of any “electronically stored
information . . . stored in any medium from which information can be obtained . . .”).
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scope was meant to be as “broad as possible,” the court saw “no room to
interpret the Rule to categorically exclude information written in a
particular medium simply because that medium stores information only
temporarily.” 445 Accordingly, the court ordered discovery of the RAM in
question. 446
3.

Parkdale America

[104] Competing motions to compel and for a protective order related to
the discovery of ESI were at issue in Parkdale America, LLC v. Travelers
Casualty & Surety Co. 447 Specifically, defendant sought discovery of
“internal e-mails, memoranda and files relating to [plaintiffs’] claims for
insurance coverage . . . .” 448 Plaintiffs objected, arguing the e-mails were
not reasonably accessible and producing them would constitute an undue
burden and expense, particularly to review for privilege. 449 The court
disagreed, noting the “disputed e-mails are presently in LotusNotes
format, rather than in a less accessible backup media.” 450 Further,
444

Columbia Pictures, 245 F.R.D. at 447 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s
notes).

445

Id. at 447. On the contrary, “Rule 34 requires no greater degree of permanency from a
medium than that which makes obtaining the data possible.” Id.
446

Id.

447

See Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88820, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007). The primary claim in the suit
sought a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to an insurance contract, defendant owed a
defense and indemnity obligation to plaintiffs for ten underlying antitrust lawsuits. Id. at
*2.
448

Id. at *11. The plaintiffs had previously produced the e-mails of one of their alleged
officers. Id. at *5, *24-25. The parties had shared the cost of this production. Id. at *25.
Defendants then sought e-mails from certain other of plaintiffs’ officers or employees.
Id.
449

Id. at *34.

450

Id. at *35.
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considering the “amount in controversy[,] . . . the parties’ apparent
resources, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving
critical factual issues,” the court concluded plaintiffs had “not articulated a
sufficient basis to relieve them of the obligation to produce [the] emails.” 451 The court went on to order that plaintiffs should make a good
faith effort to apportion costs of the production with defendant and, failing
that, could move for an order allocating costs pursuant to Zubulake I. 452
4.

Heartland Surgical

[105] The court in Heartland Surgical Specialty Hospital v. Midwest
Division, Inc. resolved a dispute over the burdensomeness of searching
personal e-mail accounts subject to a subpoena. 453 The respondents to the
451

Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Notably, plaintiffs had not offered a specific
cost estimate for producing the relevant e-mails. See Parkdale Am., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88820, at *35.
452

Parkdale Am., 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 88820, at *40. In leaving open the possibility of
cost-shifting, the court appeared to go beyond the strictures of FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(B), which permits conditions on discovery after a showing of inaccessibility
(and after good cause is shown). See, e.g., Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F.
Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009) (defendants failed to identify “which documents
[were] inaccessible or the nature of that inaccessibility” and thus “fail[ed] to provide any
grounds for shifting costs . . . .”); Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer
Human Res. Consulting, Inc., No. 05-CV-74326, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52169, at *4-5
(E.D. Mich. July 19, 2007) (granting motion to strike order that plaintiffs would bear cost
of restoring electronic data, as it was not clear that magistrate “engaged in the proper
analysis before shifting the cost of discovery to plaintiffs”). Here, again, the court
concluded that the subject e-mails were not reasonably inaccessible, and ordinarily a
party bears its own costs in responding to discovery requests. See Parkdale Am., LLC,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88820, at *35; Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,
358 (1978).
453

Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp. v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164-MLB-DWB,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53217 (D. Kan. July 20, 2007). The subpoena at issue concerned
certain physicians who were founders of a hospital. Id. at *5. The founders were not
parties to the antitrust and tortious interference suit filed by the hospital, although they
had a financial interest in the outcome. See id. at *6, *18.
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subpoena argued that searching their personal e-mail accounts would be
unduly burdensome, given that the plaintiff had already produced all emails found on business accounts maintained by the respondents. 454
Defendant, on the other hand, contended that respondents may have
destroyed some ESI, based on testimony that certain respondents had
never seen the subpoena, searched for the requested documents, nor
directed anyone else to conduct such a search. 455 The court, however,
reasoned that the respondents were “undoubtedly busy physicians who
[were] engaged in daily activities that require[d] their full attention,” and
thus concluded that “they may have not recalled or remembered
specifically what was done about the subject subpoenas.” 456 The court
therefore ruled the respondents had not “intentionally failed to comply”
with the subpoenas, nor “acted in a grossly negligent manner.” 457
[106] On the discoverability of information from the personal e-mail
accounts, it was “bothersome to the [c]ourt that no attempt at all was made
by some of the [respondents] to search, even on a random basis, their
personal or office e-mails.” 458 Nevertheless, the court recognized that
many of the remaining documents in dispute were not the type that “could
reasonably be expected to be found through an e-mail search.” 459
Applying Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s proportionality analysis, the court reasoned
that searching the personal e-mail accounts was not likely to discover any

454

See id. at *22.

455

See id. at *42-43.

456

Id. at *43.

457

Id.

458

Heartland Surgical, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53217, at *45. On the other hand, the
court noted that respondents had already produced all e-mails sent to their business
addresses. Id.
459

Id. at *46.

77

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

documents that had not already been produced. 460 Thus, the court ruled it
would not require searches of the personal e-mail accounts. 461
5.

Oracle

[107] The court in Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG analyzed Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s
proportionality standard. 462 Defendants proposed that discrete document
searches be limited to no more than 115 custodians. 463 Plaintiffs,
conversely, argued for searches involving up to 165 custodians. 464
Defendants argued that the burden and expense would outweigh any
potential benefit, noting the requested additional searches would cost
approximately $16.5 million. 465 In response, plaintiffs contended the
additional searches were justified by the stakes of the case, which
amounted to potentially hundreds of millions if not a billion dollars. 466 At
the same time, however, plaintiffs “did not propose shifting any part of
these enormous costs to them[selves].” 467

460

See id. at *44-45, *47; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

461

Heartland Surgical, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53217, at *47.

462

Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, No. C-07-01658 PJH (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319
(N.D. Cal. July 3, 2008). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants “engaged in serious
intellectual property violations through extensive illegal downloads,” leading to the theft
of “‘many hundreds’ of customers . . . .” Id. at *4.
463

Id. at *3. Searches would also be run against centralized repositories. Id. at *2.

464

Id. at *3.

465

Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Defendants also argued that because of the
volume of information the additional searches could impact the discovery deadline as
well as the trial date. Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *5.
466

Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *4.

467

Id. at *5.
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[108] In assessing proportionality, the court recognized that cost “is only
one consideration among many . . . .” 468 But the court would “not
condone forcing [d]efendants to expend $16.5 million on custodial
searches for just one aspect of what [would] undoubtedly be extensive
discovery in” the case. 469 More fundamentally, the court recognized that
it had to apply the discovery rules “in accordance with the wise mandate
of Rule 1: ‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.’” 470 The mere fact that the case, like many federal cases,
involved significant public policy issues, and that defendants possessed
significant resources, did not dissuade the court. 471 Rather, according to
the court, requiring parties to
expend many millions of dollars on discovery in each
lawsuit that fits this profile because of the explosion in the
amount and types of [ESI] . . . [would lead to businesses
being] mired in exorbitantly costly litigation where the
process of discovery becomes so onerous and prohibitively
expensive that it no longer facilitates resolution on the
merits as a means to an end, but dominates and derails the
litigation process. 472

468

Id. at *6.

469

Id.

470

Id.

471

See Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *6-7.

472

Id. at *7. Indeed, there has been much study and commentary on this “vanishing trial”
phenomenon, which is no doubt related at least in part to the increasing costs of litigation,
specifically discovery. See Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 30 LITIG. ONLINE 2, 3
(2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/litigation_
journal/04winter_openingstatement.authcheckdam.pdf (“Discovery is too broad, takes
too much time, and costs the parties too much money.”). These expenses are exacerbated
by the increasing emphasis on e-discovery. See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624
F.3d 842, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2010).
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As evidence, the court noted that not only would the discovery sought
“run afoul of the deadlines set by the trial judge,” it would also likely
“produce an avalanche of information that could not be presented to a jury
in a manner and time frame that it could digest.” 473 Thus, the court
concluded that discovery would be limited to 120 custodians. 474
6.

Mancia

[109] In Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co., Magistrate Judge
Grimm wrestled with the concepts of cooperation and proportionality as
mandated by Rule 26. 475 While prosecuting a collective action seeking
allegedly unpaid overtime and other wages, plaintiffs propounded a
number of broad discovery requests. 476 Defendants’ objections triggered a
motion to compel. 477 The court began its analysis with “[o]ne of the most
important, but apparently least understood or followed, of the discovery
rules . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g),” which requires that “every discovery
disclosure, request, response or objection must be signed by at least one
attorney of record, or the client, if unrepresented.” 478 This signature
“‘certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief formed after a reasonable inquiry,’ the disclosure is complete and
correct, and that the discovery request, response or objection is,” inter
alia, “not interposed for any improper purpose (such as to harass, cause
473

Oracle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88319, at *7.

474

Id.

475

See Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 356-57 (D. Md. 2008).

476

See id. at 355-56. The requests sought relevant e-mails and other documents. Id. at
364.
477

See id. at 355-56. As a preliminary matter, the court noted an “obvious violation” of
FED. R. OF CIV. PROC. 33(b)(4) in that defendants’ objections were not stated “with
specificity.” Id. at 356.
478

Id. at 357 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)).
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unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation) . . . .” 479
Further, the signer certifies that the requests, etc. are “neither unreasonable
nor unduly burdensome or expensive (considering the needs of the case,
prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the action).” 480
[110] The court noted a number of “important ‘take away points’ [from
Rule 26(g)] that ought to, but unfortunately do not, regulate the way
discovery is conducted.” 481 First, according to the court,
the rule is intended to impose an ‘affirmative duty’ on
counsel to behave responsibly during discovery, and to
ensure that it is conducted in a way that is consistent ‘with
the spirit and purposes’ of the discovery rules, which . . .
requires cooperation by counsel to identify and fulfill
legitimate discovery needs, yet avoid seeking discovery the
cost and burden of which is disproportionately large to
what is at stake in the litigation. 482
Second, the “rule is intended to curb discovery abuse by requiring the
court to impose sanctions if it is violated, absent ‘substantial justification,’
and those sanctions are intended both to penalize the noncompliant lawyer
or unrepresented client, and to deter others from noncompliance.” 483
Third, the “rule aspires to eliminate one of the most prevalent of all

479

Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(A), (B)(i)-(ii)).

480

Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii)).

481

Id.

482

Id. at 357-58.

483

Id. at 358.
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discovery abuses:
kneejerk discovery requests served without
consideration of cost or burden to the responding party.” 484
[111] Working in tandem is Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s proportionality test,
under which a court has an obligation, sua sponte, to limit discovery
where the burden or expense outweighs its likely benefit, “considering the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues.” 485 The court recognized the reality,
however, that with “certain discovery, principally interrogatories and
document production requests, lawyers customarily serve requests that are
far broader, more redundant and burdensome than necessary . . . .” 486 This
“failure to engage in discovery as required by Rule 26(g) is one reason
why the cost of discovery is so widely criticized as being excessive—to
the point of pricing litigants out of court.” 487 As a result, “[d]eserving
cases are not brought because the cost of pursuing them fails a rational
cost-benefit test, while meritless cases, especially smaller cases, are being
settled rather than being tried because it costs too much to litigate
them.” 488 E-discovery, of course, exacerbates the problem of discovery
484

Id. The court also noted that Rule 26(g) was meant to end the “equally abusive
practice of objecting to discovery requests reflexively—but not reflectively—and without
a factual basis.” Id. Specifically, the court recognized that “boilerplate objections that a
request for discovery is ‘overbroad and unduly burdensome, and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of material admissible in evidence,’ persist despite a
litany of decisions from courts, including this one, that such objections are improper
unless based on particularized facts.” Id. (citations omitted). In fact, according to the
court, “the very act of making such boilerplate objections is prima facie evidence of a
Rule 26(g) violation . . . .” Id. at 359.
485

Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 364 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)).

486

Id. at 358.

487

Id. at 359.

488

Id. (quoting AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008)).
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costs, and “is partly responsible for making federal litigation ‘procedurally
more complex, risky to prosecute, and very expensive . . . .’” 489
[112] The court disputed the notion there is anything inherent in our
adversary system “that precludes cooperation between the parties and their
attorneys during the litigation process to achieve orderly and cost effective
discovery . . . .” 490 In this regard, the court may have overlooked the
incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel, in class or other complex litigation, to
run up their opponent’s discovery costs in hopes of extracting a settlement,
whatever the merits of the case. 491 Thus, while a “lawyer who seeks
excessive discovery given what is at stake in the litigation, . . . or pursues
discovery in order to make the cost for his or her adversary so great that
the case settles to avoid the transaction costs” may well be “hindering the
adjudication process,” the court ignored that to such lawyers this is a
feature of the system–not a bug. 492
[113] The court concluded that a number of defendants’ objections were
“boilerplate” and “non-particularized,” and thus violated Rule 33. 493 At
the same time, the court noted that much of the discovery propounded by
489

Id. at 359 (quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Trial Balloon: Federal Litigation—Where Did
It Go off Track?, 34 LITIG. 5, 62 (2008) (quotation marks omitted)).
490

Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 360-61 (noting further that “[t]he apparent ineffectiveness of
Rule 26(g) in changing the way discovery is in fact practiced often is excused by arguing
that the cooperation that judges expect during discovery is unrealistic because it is at odds
with the demands of the adversary system . . . . But this is just not so.”).
491

See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2010)
(recognizing that corporate defendants typically have “much more extensive” records
than class action plaintiffs, and noting propensity of the latter to “want to rummage in
quest for smoking guns”).
492

Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 362; see Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 850, 855-56 (noting that
although merit of case was “slight,” pressure to settle would “mount up if class counsel’s
ambitious program of discovery is allowed to continue”).

493

Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 363-64. The court explained that defendants’ failure to make
timely, specific objections waived any legitimate objection that existed. See id. at 364.
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plaintiffs “might be excessive or overly burdensome, given the nature of
[the] case, the few number of named Plaintiffs and the relatively modest
amounts of wages claimed for each.” 494 Thus, the court ordered the
parties to meet and confer and “attempt to identify a foreseeable range of
damages” in an effort to determine the value of the case, which would then
inform a “workable ‘discovery budget’ that is proportional to what is at
issue in the case.” 495 The parties were then to
discuss the amount and type of discovery already provided,
and . . . the additional discovery still sought by Plaintiffs,
in order to evaluate the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) factors, to
determine whether Plaintiffs’ legitimate additional
discovery needs could be fulfilled from non-duplicative,
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive
sources than those currently sought . . . . 496
If the parties were unable to reach agreement on the additional requested
discovery, the court would then rule based on the factors discussed
previously. 497
C.

Search Methodology—No Routine Access to Opponent’s
Systems
1.

Scotts

[114] In The Scotts Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 498
plaintiff moved to compel an order that “would require defendant to allow
494

Id.

495

Id. This admittedly “rough estimate” would also include plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees
assuming they prevailed. Id.
496

Id.

497

Id. at 365.
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a forensic expert to search defendant’s computer systems, network servers
and databases and would require defendant to provide backup tapes of
certain information systems to include data for the last nine years.” 499 The
court, however, denied the motion, reasoning the amendments to Rule 34
“simply clarif[ied] ‘that discovery of [ESI] stands on equal footing with
discovery of paper documents.’” 500 Thus, “without a qualifying reason,
plaintiff is no more entitled to access to defendant’s electronic information
storage systems than to defendant’s warehouses storing paper
documents.” 501 As to whether plaintiff had a sufficient reason for the
motion, the court concluded not—the motion was based on “mere
suspicion,” and “speculation [was], in the view of this court, entirely
insufficient.” 502
2.

Ferron

[115] In Ferron v. Search Cactus, L.L.C., 503 the court found “qualifying
reasons sufficient to permit [d]efendants access to [p]laintiff’s computer
498

Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43005 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007).
499

Id. at *4. Plaintiff contended that the 2006 amendments to Rule 34 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure supported its motion. Id.

500

Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes).

501

Id. at *5; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes (“[Revised Rule 34]
is not meant to create a routine right of direct access to a party’s electronic information
system.”).
502

Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *6; see also Williams v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 144, 146 (D. Mass. 2005) (denying motion to appoint computer
forensic expert where movant failed to show “that Defendants are unwilling to produce
computer-generated documents”); Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329-30 (D.D.C.
2003) (denying motion to compel because “inspection or seizure [of ESI] is not permitted
unless the moving party can ‘demonstrate that the documents they seek to compel do, in
fact, exist and are being unlawfully withheld’” (citation omitted)).
503

John W. Ferron v. Search Cactus LLC, No. 2:06-cv-327, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34599 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 2008).
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systems” that had been absent in Scotts. 504
Specifically, the court
concluded plaintiff had not properly implemented a litigation hold. 505 In
addition, the court noted that plaintiff had not produced the requested
information and his computers “contain[ed] the only available
documentary evidence of his visits to the websites in issue . . . .” 506 Given
plaintiff had not previously produced the information, the court
distinguished Scotts on the basis that defendants did not seek the reproduction of ESI but rather sought information that plaintiff should
already have preserved and produced. 507 Accordingly, the court ordered
that plaintiff allow defendants’ forensic computer expert to image his hard
drives. 508
3.

Adams

[116] In Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Fujitsu Ltd., the court
applied the general rule that the 2006 amendments did not create a routine
right of access to an opponent’s systems, but did find sampling
504

Id. at *8; see supra note 501 and accompanying text.

505

Ferron, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34599, at *8-9. Defendants sought discovery of emails received and websites visited by plaintiff, which formed the basis of his consumer
fraud claim. Id. at *2.
506

Id. at *8.

507

Id.; see also Diepenhorst v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:05-cv-734, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48551, *10-11 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2006).

508

Ferron, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34599, at *13-14. Other courts have allowed access to
a party’s computer systems where some type of discovery misconduct can be shown.
See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (allowing access to party’s
computer system based on showing of systemic deletion of relevant emails); Ameriwood
Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93380, *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006)
(granting motion to compel imaging of defendant’s hard drive where court had “cause to
question whether defendants have produced all responsive documents”); cf. In re Ford
Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[w]hile some kind of direct access [to
systems] might be permissible in certain cases,” a necessary prerequisite would be “a
factual finding of some non-compliance with discovery rules”).
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appropriate. 509 Defendant contended that relevant data was located on old
computers that plaintiffs had not previously searched. 510 Plaintiff, in
response, claimed that it would take hundreds of hours to search all the
computers at issue and, in any event, he had used those computers to
produce archives from which his production came. 511
[117] Noting the parties “dr[ew] opposite conclusions” on the sufficiency
of plaintiff’s initial search, the court was “unable to determine” whether
the burden of making plaintiff conduct additional searches on the old
computers would outweigh the likely benefit. 512 To inform this analysis,
the court ordered plaintiff to produce an inventory of his old computers. 513
Defendant could then select one computer from the list and require
plaintiff to produce the directories and file structure for that computer. 514
If this sampling revealed “something significant,” defendant could move
for further discovery. 515

509

See Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-64, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 45576, at *24-25 (D. Utah May 10, 2010). In Adams, defendant sought an
order compelling disclosure of ESI in native format, including metadata and file trees
found on plaintiff’s computers. See id. at *16.
510

Id. at *22.

511

Id.

512

Id. at *23

513

Id. at *24. The inventory included the “computer make and model; serial number;
storage devices and capacity of the storage devices associated with the computer; dates
the computer was in service; by whom it was used; a general description of the uses of
the computer; any archive or backup related to the computer; a summary of the type of
data on the computer; and the current location and custodian of the computer.” Id.
514

Adams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45576, at *25. If plaintiff identified ten or more
computers, then defendant would be entitled to select two computers for further
examination. Id.

515

Id.
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Ford

[118] Pointing to a “noticeable absence” of relevant documents in its
opponent’s production, defendant in Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood
Properties, Inc. requested access to plaintiff’s systems to run “narrowly
tailored key word search[es] . . . .” 516 Plaintiff’s production was based on
a “manual document collection process,” rather than electronic searches,
which the court recognized was “not necessarily contemplated under the
Sedona Principles . . . .” 517 At the same time, however, the court noted the
responding party is presumed to be “in the best position to choose an
appropriate method of searching and culling data.” 518
Rejecting
defendant’s “conclusory allegation” that it had “not received all of the
documents to which it is entitled,” 519 the court ruled that “reinventing the
wheel,” i.e., allowing access for electronic searches to test the efficacy of
the prior manual searches, would be unduly burdensome to plaintiff. 520
Given that defendant had not made a “colorable showing” that plaintiff
had either intentionally or negligently withheld documents, and that a
subjective belief that “documents must exist simply is not enough” to
require further discovery, the court denied the motion to compel. 521
516

Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 427 (D.N.J. 2009).

517

Id.; see The Sedona Conference Working Grp. on Best Practices for Document
Retention and Prod., The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 195
(2007) [hereinafter Sedona Best Practices Commentary].
518

Ford, 257 F.R.D. at 427 (quoting Sedona Best Practices Commentary, supra note 517,
at 195) (internal quotation marks omitted).
519

Id. at 427. Indeed, the court noted that such “nefarious speculation has not moved
several courts, nor will it move this one, to grant burdensome discovery requests late in
the game.” Id.
520

Id.

521

Id. at 428. The court did note that if subsequent depositions revealed the existence of
unproduced documents defendant could then move for appropriate relief. Id.
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Bank of Mongolia

[119] In Bank of Mongolia v. M&P Global Financial Services, Inc.,
defendants failed to timely respond to document requests or produce
responsive documents. 522 Plaintiff then sought “access to [d]efendants’
electronic records and computer hardware” to conduct searches. 523 At the
hearing on plaintiff’s motion, defendants conceded they had not yet
searched their electronic data and requested additional time for their expert
to do so. 524 The court, however, denied this request, “in view of the . . .
[d]efendants’ past lack of response to [p]laintiff’s request for information .
. . .” 525 Instead, the court concluded that “an independent expert should be
appointed to retrieve any deleted responsive files from [d]efendants’
computers.” 526 In denying plaintiff’s request for direct access to
defendants’ systems, the court reasoned that the “failure to adequately
respond to [p]laintiff’s request for documents is not sufficient grounds to
give [p]laintiff unfettered access to [d]efendants’ computer system.” 527

522

Bank of Mongolia v. M&P Global Financial Servs., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 514, 516 (S.D.
Fla. 2009).
523

Id. at 517.

524

Id.

525

Id. at 520.

526

Id. The independent expert would create a mirror image of defendants’ systems. Id.
The expert would then use terms agreed to by the parties (with the court resolving any
disputes) to search the mirror image results. Id. at 521. Plaintiff was ordered to pay the
cost of employing the expert, although the court agreed to revisit the issue if evidence of
spoliation by the defendants turned up. Id. The court also ordered that defendants pay
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees associated with bringing the motion, a total of $3,400. Id. at
522.
527

Bank of Mongolia, 258 F.R.D. at 521; see also In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 1315,
1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 34(a) does not grant unrestricted, direct access to a
respondent’s database compilations.”).
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Search Methodology—Keywords Challenged
1.

O’Keefe

[120] Defendants attempted to challenge the suitability of certain search
terms in United States v. O’Keefe. 528 The court reasoned that “[w]hether
search terms or ‘keywords’ will yield the information sought is a
complicated question involving the interplay, at least, of the sciences of
computer technology, statistics and linguistics.” 529 As a result, according
to the court, “for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search
term or terms would be more likely to produce the information than the
terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.” 530 Because
the suitability of particular keywords is “clearly beyond the ken of a
layman,” the court concluded “that any such conclusion [would have to]
be based on evidence that . . . meets the criteria of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.” 531 Accordingly, the court directed that if defendants
528

See United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2008). O’Keefe
involved criminal charges alleging one defendant, a former State Department employee,
expedited visa requests in exchange for gifts and other improper benefits. Id. at 15-16.
Though the proceeding was criminal, the court applied the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, noting the criminal rules did not address the document production issues
presented. See id. at 18-19. In the court’s view, it would have been “foolish” to ignore
the Rules “merely because this is a criminal case.” Rather, it was “far better to use these
rules than to reinvent the wheel when the production of documents in criminal and civil
cases raises the same problems.” Id. at 19.
529

Id. at 24.

530

Id.; cf. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Grand Cent. Donuts, Inc., No. CV
2007-4027 (ENV)(MDG), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52261, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. June 19,
2009) (directing defendants to provide their opponent with “a list of the employees or
former employees whose e-mails they want searched and the specific search terms to be
used for each individual”).
531

O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 24. Rule 702 provides that a “witness who is qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify in the form
of an opinion . . . if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .” FED.
R. EVID. 702.
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wanted to challenge the search terms used, they must file a motion to
compel “based on evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 702 . . .
.” 532
2.

Equity Analytics

[121] Similarly, in Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, decided by the same
Magistrate Judge as O’Keefe, 533 in considering a dispute as to the efficacy
of search terms the court ordered the challenger’s expert to submit an
affidavit detailing his concerns with the terms proposed. 534 In doing so,
the court again emphasized that “determining whether a particular search
methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be effective certainly
requires knowledge beyond the ken of a lay person (and a lay lawyer) and
requires expert testimony that meets the requirements of Rule 702 . . . .” 535
3.

Victor Stanley I

[122] In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.(Victor Stanley I),
plaintiff argued that 165 electronic documents produced by defendants
“occurred under circumstances that waived any privilege or protected
status.” 536 In concluding that any privilege had indeed been waived,
Magistrate Judge Grimm delved into the search methodologies employed
532

O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 24.

533

United States Magistrate Judge Facciola. See O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 14; Equity
Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 2008).

534

Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. at 333.

535

Id. The court conceded the efficacy of the “contemplated forensic search . . . [was]
beyond any experience or knowledge I can claim.” Id.; see also Asarco, Inc. v. U.S.
EPA, No. 08-1332 (EGS/JMF), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37182, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2009) (noting that “keyword searches are no longer the favored methodology” and
ordering that party conduct another search using additional keywords).
536

Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley I), 250 F.R.D. 251, 253 (D.
Md. 2008).
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by defendants in their privilege review. 537 The review used seventy
keywords which were selected by one of the defendants and his
attorneys. 538 According to the court, defendants were “regrettably vague”
in describing how the keywords were developed, “how the search was
conducted, and what quality controls were employed to assess their
reliability and accuracy.” 539 In particular, the court noted “nothing [was]
known . . . regarding [defendant’s and his attorneys’] qualifications for
designing a search and information retrieval strategy that could be
expected to produce an effective and reliable privilege review.” 540
[123] The court further criticized defendants for not conducting any
sampling to “see if the search results were reliable.” 541 According to the
court, the “only prudent way to test the reliability of the keyword search is
to perform some appropriate sampling of the documents determined to be
privileged and those determined not to be in order to arrive at a comfort
level that the categories are neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.” 542
537

See id. at 253-54, 256.

538

Id. at 256.

539

Id.

540

Id.

541

Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 257. Instead, defendants apparently simply produced
all documents identified by the keyword search as non-privileged. Id.
542

Id. According to the court, “[c]ommon sense suggests that even a properly designed
and executed keyword search may prove to be over-inclusive or under-inclusive,
resulting in the identification of documents as privileged which are not, and nonprivileged which, in fact, are.” Id. In CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., No.
1:07-CV-1822-TWT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84189, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2008), 102
search terms resulted in 1.4 million responsive documents. 500,000 of the documents
were “potentially privileged.” Id. at *10. After determining that plaintiff bore
responsibility for selecting the search terms, the court ordered cost-shifting of $300,000
to pay defendant’s costs in conducting the privilege review. Id. at *8, *10. In addition,
the court awarded defendant attorney’s fees of $86,786.95 related to the motion to
compel. Id. at *12.
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This failure to sample provided further support for the conclusion that
defendants’ search efforts were not adequate. 543
[124] Discussing search protocols generally, the court acknowledged that
while “keyword searches are useful tools for search and retrieval of ESI,
all keyword searches are not created equal . . . .” 544 Instead, “there is a
growing body of literature that highlights the risks associated with
conducting an unreliable or inadequate keyword search or relying
exclusively on such searches for privilege review.” 545 Citing O’Keefe and
Equity Analytics, the court reasoned that “proper selection and
implementation [of search terms] obviously involves technical, if not

543

See Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 262.

544

Id. at 256-57. Indeed, the court noted “[k]eyword searching may be accomplished in
many ways,” ranging from simple use of “individual keywords . . . . [to] more advanced
search techniques, such as Boolean proximity operators . . . .” Id. at 261 n.9. Boolean
operators combine a keyword with phrases such as “or,” “and,” or “not” to locate
responsive documents. Id. Beyond keywords are more advanced methods such as:
probabilistic search models, including ‘Bayesian classifiers’ (which
searches by creating a formula based on values assigned to particular
words based on their interrelationships, proximity, and frequency to
establish a relevancy ranking that is applied to each document
searched); ‘Fuzzy Search Models’ (which attempt to refine a search
beyond specific words, recognizing that words can have multiple
forms. By identifying the ‘core’ for a word the fuzzy search can
retrieve documents containing all forms of the target word);
‘Clustering’ searches (searches of documents by grouping them by
similarity of content, for example, the presence of a series of same or
similar words that are found in multiple documents); and ‘Concept and
Categorization Tools’ (search systems that rely on a thesaurus to
capture documents which use alternative ways to express the same
thought).
Id.
545

Id. at 257.
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scientific knowledge.” 546 While acknowledging that those opinions had
“raised the eyebrows of some commentators” who feared that the use of
experts would multiply already exorbitant e-discovery costs, the court
stated that a “careful reading of O’Keefe and Equity Analytics . . . should
allay these concerns.” 547
[125] According to the court,
It cannot credibly be denied that resolving contested issues
of whether a particular search and information retrieval
method was appropriate . . . involves scientific, technical or
specialized information. If so, then, the trial judge must
decide a method’s appropriateness with the benefit of
information from some reliable source—whether an
affidavit from a qualified expert, a learned treatise, or, if
appropriate, from information judicially noticed. 548
Indeed, the court termed it “risky for a trial judge to attempt to resolve
issues involving technical areas without the aid of expert assistance.” 549
Thus, in the court’s view,
all that O’Keefe and Equity Analytics required was that the
parties be prepared to back up their positions with respect
to a dispute involving the appropriateness of ESI search
and information retrieval methodology—obviously an area
of science or technology—with reliable information from

546

Id. at 260; see also In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 660 n.6, 662
(M.D. Fla. 2007) (criticizing defendant’s use of keyword search methodology); Sedona
Best Practices Commentary, supra note 517, at 201 (“[S]imple keyword searching alone
is inadequate in at least some discovery contexts.”).

547

Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 261 n.10.

548

Id.

549

Id.
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someone with the qualifications to provide helpful
opinions, not conclusory argument by counsel. 550
[126] Attempting to address the cost concerns mentioned previously, the
court simply
repeat[ed] that the cost-benefit balancing factors of . . .
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) apply to all aspects of discovery, and
parties worried about the cost of employing properly
designed search and information retrieval methods have an
incentive to keep the costs of this phase of discovery as low
as possible, including attempting to confer with their
opposing party in an effort to identify a mutually agreeable
search and retrieval method. 551
Such an agreement would minimize “cost because if the method is
approved, there will be no dispute resolving its sufficiency, and doing it
right the first time is always cheaper than doing it over if ordered to do so
by the court.” 552 Needless to say, this discussion does nothing to “allay”
the cost concerns occasioned by the O’Keefe and Equity Analytics
decisions. 553 On the contrary, it appears to cement those concerns. The
court’s reference to an “incentive” to keep discovery costs low fails to
recognize that quite often there is only one party with such an incentive—
its opponent wants the opposite. 554 Whether requiring agreement to
550

Id.

551

Id.

552

Victor Stanley I, 250 F.R.D. at 261 n.10.

553

See id.

554

See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 848-49 (7th Cir. 2010).
Likewise, courts and commentators considered the proportionality analysis commended
by this court to be ineffective under the pre-amendment version of the Rules. See supra
note 269, and accompanying text. It is far from clear that the amended Rule
26(b)(2)(C)’s cost-benefit test is any more effective than the previous version. See Duke:
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overly broad search terms the opponent wants, or hiring an expert to
justify more constrained terms, this line of cases, if followed, simply adds
yet another layer of costs to the e-discovery process. 555
4.

William A. Gross

[127] In William A. Gross Construction Associates, Inc. v. American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., the court issued a “wake-up call to
the Bar . . . about the need for careful thought, quality control, testing, and
cooperation with opposing counsel in designing search terms or
‘keywords’ to be used to produce e-mails or other [ESI].” 556 The dispute
centered on the production of e-mails from a non-party to the suit. 557 The
parties could not agree on keywords, with each side proposing terms the
other party considered either too narrow or too broad. 558 As a result, the
court was “left . . . in the uncomfortable position of having to craft a
keyword search methodology for the parties, without adequate information
. . . .” 559 Concluding that the case was just the latest example of lawyers
designing keyword searches in the dark, the court joined the O’Keefe line
of cases in requiring that search methodology be supported by “something
Providing Tools to Cope with E-Discovery Issues, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS.,
June 2, 2010, at 12 (noting consensus that proportionality standard “is not used very
often, if at all”).
555

See, e.g., Thorogood, 624 F.3d at 849-50.

556

William A. Gross Constr. Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
557

Id.

558

Id. at 135. The court noted the “problem would have been avoided . . . if [the nonparty] used a standard ‘Re’ line in its . . . e-mails to distinguish [the relevant] project from
its other work. It did not do so, however.” Id. It may bear mentioning that businesses
use e-mail to conduct business, not prepare for discovery obligations in some future,
unanticipated litigation years hence.
559

Id.
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other than a lawyer’s guesses . . . without any quality control testing to see
if the search terms produce reasonably all the responsive ESI and limited
‘false positives.’” 560 Summing up, the court endorsed “cooperation
among counsel” as the “best solution in the entire area of electronic
discovery . . . .” 561 Again, whether this is a realistic solution is far from
clear.
5.

Fannie Mae

[128] In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation illustrates the potential
pitfalls of cooperation: a third party responding to a subpoena spent
millions of dollars for failing to conduct timely searches on overly broad
but agreed-to key words, and the court still held the party in contempt. 562
The third party’s initial response to the subpoena did not include searching
backup tapes. 563 When the requesting parties objected and moved to hold
the third party in contempt, the third party agreed to search its backup
tapes; the parties memorialized this agreement in a stipulated order. 564
Pursuant to this agreement, the requesting parties submitted over 400
search terms which implicated approximately 660,000 documents. 565 The
560

Id. at 136 n.3. Surprisingly, the court held that it “need not now decide whether expert
testimony is required” to validate a search. Id.

561

William A. Gross, 256 F.R.D. at 136 n.3; see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes,
LLC, 261 F.R.D. 44, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (involving an agreement between parties on
nine search terms, but requiring court to resolve dispute as to other thirty).
562

In re Fannie Mae Secs. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The third party,
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”), regulates the Federal
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”). Id. at 816. During litigation over alleged accounting
irregularities by Fannie Mae, several of its senior executives issued subpoenas to
OFHEO. Id.
563

Id. at 817.

564

Id.

565

Id.
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third party objected, claiming that under the agreement the requesting
parties were limited to providing “appropriate search terms.” 566 The
district court disagreed, however, ruling that the agreement 567 “gave the
[requesting parties] sole discretion to specify search terms and imposed no
limits on permissible terms.” 568 The third party then took “extensive
efforts to comply” with its production obligations under the agreement,
“hiring fifty contract attorneys solely for that purpose” and spending “over
$6 million, more than 9 percent of the agency’s entire annual budget.” 569
Nevertheless, the third party was not able to comply in a timely manner
with its production deadlines, leading the district court to hold it in
contempt. 570
[129] On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the lower court
that the agreement obligated the third party to use whatever search terms
the requesting parties specified. 571 The appellate court likewise rejected
the argument that “the district court violated Rule 45 by compelling
compliance without considering cost-shifting, narrowing the scope of the
requests, or finding that [the requesting parties] demonstrated good cause
for forcing [the third party] to retrieve its inaccessible data.” 572 According
to the court, “[w]hatever the merits of these claims, [the third party]
566

Id.

567

The specific terms at issue provided that “OFHEO will work with the [requesting
parties] to provide the necessary information (without individual document review) to
develop appropriate search terms. By October 19, 2007, the [requesting parties] will
specify the search terms to be used.” In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d at 817.

568

Id.

569

Id.

570

Id. at 818. As a sanction, the district court ordered production of all documents
withheld on the sole basis of the qualified deliberative process privilege and not logged
by a certain deadline. Id.

571

Id. at 819.

572

In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted).

98

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVIII, Issue 3

abandoned them by entering into the stipulated order.” 573 Thus, in the
court’s view the third party could “hardly complain now about being held
to its agreement.” 574
E.

Form of Production—Metadata, etc.
1.

Scotts

[130] In Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., plaintiff sought
an order requiring defendant to reproduce certain electronic data,
including metadata, “in the form in which it was maintained by defendant
instead of in the hard copy form in which it ha[d] been produced . . . .” 575
573

Id. at 821-22.

574

Id. at 822. Of course, the major point in dispute was whether the third party agreed to
the undeniably overbroad and unduly burdensome search terms. Thus, under these
circumstances it is not particularly persuasive to conclude that the third party had no
grounds to complain about the scope of the subpoena because it agreed to it. This is
especially so given that Rule 45 mandates that a “party or attorney responsible for issuing
and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or
expense on a person subject to the subpoena. The issuing court must enforce this duty . .
. .” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1). Indeed, as Magistrate Grimm explained in Mancia v.
Mayflower Textile Services Co., the court has a sua sponte obligation to limit discovery
where the burden or expense outweighs the likely benefit. 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md.
2008); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1); supra text
accompanying notes 485-97. Spending $6 million and over 9 percent of an annual
budget responding to a subpoena would certainly seem to be an undue burden and
expense, no matter the alleged terms of agreement. Thus, if anything, In re Fannie Mae
provides yet another example of the difficulty of relying on the proportionality concepts
of the Federal Rules to effectively limit the scope or expense of e-discovery.
575

Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43005, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007). The court examined several sources to define
“metadata,” and settled on a few. Id. It is “commonly described as ‘data about data,’ is
defined as a ‘set of data that describes and gives information about other data.’” Id. at
*11 n.2 (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY). The Sedona Conference defines
metadata as “information about a particular data set which describes how, when and by
whom it was collected, created, accessed, or modified and how it is formatted (including
data demographics such as size, location, storage requirements and media information).”
Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *11 n.2 (quoting THE SEDONA GUIDELINES:
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Plaintiff argued that “as a ‘matter of law, a party’s discovery obligations
are not satisfied by the production of computerized information in a hard
copy format.’” 576
[131] Citing Rule 34, however, the court concluded this “assertion is
simply an incorrect statement of the law.” 577 Rather, the court noted that
under Rule 34 both parties play a role in the form of production. 578 That
is, a party may specify the form in which it wants the ESI produced;
plaintiff, however, had failed to do so in its requests. 579 Likewise, in its
responses defendant had not specified the form it intended to use for its
production, as required under Rule 34 when the propounding party does
not specify the form. 580 Relying on the Advisory Committee Notes to the
2006 amendments, the court recognized that if “the responding party
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it
searchable by electronic means, the information should not be produced in

BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION AND
RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE, at Appendix F (Charles R. Ragan et. al eds., 2005),
available
at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf).
Common examples of metadata include: “a file’s name, a file’s location (e.g., directory
structure or pathname), file format or file type, file size, file dates (e.g., creation date,
date of last data modification, date of last data access, and date of last metadata
modification), and file permissions (e.g., who can read the data, who can write to it, who
can run it).” Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *11 n.2. File dates and size can
often be seen by users, but “other metadata can be hidden or embedded and unavailable
to computer users who are not technically adept.” Id.; see Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins.
Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 547 (D. Md. 2007) (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co.,
230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005)).
576

Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *13.

577

Id.

578

Id.

579

Id. at *12.

580

Id.
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a form that removes or significantly degrades this feature.” 581 While
plaintiff argued the hard copy production impaired its ability to use the
information by not permitting searches for metadata, the court concluded
the parties should meet and confer on this issue. 582
2.

Ford

[132] In Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Properties, Inc., the defendant
requested that plaintiff “produce documents in native format.” 583 In
response, the plaintiff produced documents in “Tagged Image File Format
(‘TIFF’) with accompanying searchable text.” 584
After plaintiff
essentially completed the production, defendant objected to the form. 585
[133] According to the court, the “producing party ordinarily must take
into account the need for metadata to make otherwise unintelligible
documents understandable.” 586 But, “crucially” in the court’s view,
defendant did not object to the production “within a reasonable period of
time. . . .” 587 While the court did not “dictat[e] a rigid formulation as to
when a party must object to a document production,” it simply held that
waiting until after the production was “virtually complete” was
581

Scotts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43005, at *14.

582

Id. at *14-15.

583

Ford Motor Co. v. Edgewood Props., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 418, 424 (D.N.J. 2009).

584

Id.

585

Id. at 425-26.

586

Id. at 425; see also Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of the
United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 255 F.R.D. 350, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that
metadata is generally ordered produced when “it is sought in the initial document request
and the producing party has not yet produced the documents in any form”); THE SEDONA
PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at ii (see Principle 12).
587

Ford, 257 F.R.D. at 425.
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unreasonable. 588 Because defendant had waived its objection, and it
“without question [would be] unduly burdensome to a party months after
production to require that party to reconstitute their entire production to
appease a late objection,” the court denied the motion to compel. 589
3.

Covad

[134] In Covad Communications Co. v. Revonet, Inc., the defendant
refused to produce e-mails in their native format, instead proposing to
make them available in hard copy or TIFF files. 590 That is, defendant
“claim[ed] the right to convert the e-mails from their native format to
other formats even though those are not as easily searchable by electronic
means as the e-mails in their native format would be.” 591 Defendant’s
justification for doing so was that plaintiff had not specified the format for
the production of the e-mails. 592
[135] Pursuant to Rule 34, the court noted “the requesting party may
[specify] the form in which [ESI] should be produced and,” failing that,
the production should be in the “form in which [the information] is
ordinarily maintained, or in a reasonably usable form.” 593 The parties had

588

Id. at 426. The court commended “[r]easonableness [a]s the touchstone principle, as it
is with most discovery obligations.” Id.
589

Id. The court noted the “entire problem could have been avoided had there been an
explicit agreement between the parties as to production, but . . . that ship ha[d] sailed . . .
.” Id.

590

Covad Commc’ns. Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 147, 148 (D.D.C. 2008).

591

Id.

592

See id. at 148-49.

593

Id. at 149; see also MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc., No. 06-2318-JWL-DJW, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76853, at *9-10 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2007) (noting that “the producing
party must either produce the documents as they are kept in the usual course of business
or organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request” and that “[i]f
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not discussed what form the production would take, but instead appeared
to “mak[e] assumptions based on each others’ behavior: [plaintiff]
expect[ed] its documents in electronic form because [defendant] hired a
company to collect [ESI], and [defendant] assum[ed] that they should
produce 35,000 pages of e-mails in hard copy because [plaintiff] produced
its documents in that format.” 594 While recognizing that plaintiff’s
instructions in the document requests were “hopelessly imprecise and
[defendant] could colorably argue that [they] should be interpreted to
include several different formats,” the court concluded that “no reasonable
person can honestly believe that hard copy is one of them.” 595 Indeed,
according to the court, while it was unclear what plaintiff asked for, it was
clear what they had not asked for, “and that is what they got.” 596 Thus, the
court ordered that defendant “produce the e-mails . . . in their native
format.” 597
[136] The court went on to conclude that the parties should share the cost
of removing any privileged e-mails from the production up to $4,000, i.e.,
$2,000 per party. 598 While ordinarily defendant would bear this cost
the producing party produces documents [in order] . . . the Rule imposes no duty to
organize and label the documents . . .”).
594

Covad, 254 F.R.D. at 149.

595

Id. at 150.

596

Id.

597

Id. at 151. In doing so, the court noted there was authority from “at least 2000 that
indicated that a party could be required to produce data in an electronic format even
though it had already produced it in hard copy.” Id. at 150-51 (citing Shira A. Scheindlin
& Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the
Task?, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 327, 355 (2000)). Thus, according to the court, defendant “played
with fire” by producing the e-mails only in hard copy. Id. at 151. But the court did not
mention Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(iii)’s provision that a “party need not produce the same [ESI]
in more than one form.” See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii).
598

Covad, 254 F.R.D. at 151.
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alone, the court recognized that plaintiff had “play[ed] with the same fire”
by likewise producing its documents in hard copy. 599 Thus, characterizing
the dispute as “both parties [going] through the same stop sign,” the court
concluded “that they both should pay for the crash.” 600 Indeed, the court
hoped its decision would “have a didactic purpose” by emphasizing the
need for parties to confer with each other “on such a fundamental question
as the format of their productions of [ESI].” 601
4.

Dahl

[137] In Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, plaintiffs sought
production of all the “metadata associated with e-mails and word
documents produced” by defendants. 602 The court, however, rejected this
request, noting that “case law shows wariness about metadata’s value in
litigation.” 603 Indeed, according to the court, “Rule 34 militates against
the broad, open disclosure of metadata that” plaintiffs sought. 604 Instead,
the court explained that discovery requests should be narrowly tailored “so
only necessary data is produced.” 605 Applying this principle, the court
599

Id.; see also Peskoff v. Faber, 251 F.R.D. 59, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2008) (examining costshifting when the information sought could only be obtained through a costly forensic
examination).

600

Covad, 254 F.R.D. at 151.

601

Id.

602

Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009).

603

Id.; see, e.g., Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, Inc., No. 05-138-WOB, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92028, at *24 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2006) (“In most cases and for most
documents, metadata does not provide relevant information”); Wyeth v. Impax Labs.,
Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006) (“Most metadata is of limited evidentiary value,
and reviewing it can waste litigation resources”).
604

Dahl, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 149.

605

Id. at 150.
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concluded that “[r]ather than a sweeping request for metadata, [plaintiffs]
should tailor their requests to specific word documents, specific e-mails or
specific sets of e-mail . . . .” 606 The court hoped this “more focused
approach [would] . . . reduce the parties’ costs and work.” 607
F.
1.

Significant Recent Sanctions Cases
Zubulake Revisited—Pension Committee

[138] In Pension Committee of the University of Montreal Pension Plan
v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, Judge Scheindlin revisited the
preservation principles she initially set forth in the Zubulake series of
opinions six years earlier. 608 Certain defendants moved for sanctions,
arguing “plaintiff[s] failed to preserve . . . [relevant] documents” and then
606

Id.; see also Ojeda-Sanchez v. Bland Farms, LLC, No. CV608-096, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66238, at *11 (S.D. Ga. July 31, 2009) (ordering production of metadata where
plaintiffs showed “particularized need for the information”); cf. Bray & Gillespie Mgmt.
LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D. 568, 582-83, 590-91 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(sanctioning plaintiff and counsel for falsely telling opposing counsel that plaintiff “had
caused all of its ESI to be printed and scanned to support the position that [plaintiff]
could not produce metadata or text searchable documents”); Williams v. Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005) (clarifying that order to produce ESI “in
the form in which it is regularly maintained, i.e., in its native format or as an active file, .
. . must include all metadata unless . . . party timely objects to production of the metadata,
the parties agree that the metadata should not be produced, or the producing party
requests a protective order.”).
607

Dahl, 655 F. Supp. 2d at 150. The court did require that certain excel spreadsheets be
produced in their native format, drawing a distinction with metadata “because of [their]
different functions . . . .” Id. at n.1. According to the court, “[m]aintaining spreadsheets
in their native format is necessary to assure the integral elements of a spreadsheet remain
undisturbed. In contrast, the court [was] not convinced that metadata is an integral
element of a given e-mail or word document.” Id.
608

Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC,
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Once again, I have been compelled to
closely review the discovery efforts of parties in a litigation, and once again have found
that those efforts were flawed.”).
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“submitted false and misleading declarations regarding their” discovery
efforts. 609 While acknowledging that “[c]ourts cannot and do not expect
that any party can meet a standard of perfection,” the court explained that
it has “a right to expect that litigants and counsel will take the necessary
steps to ensure that relevant records are preserved when litigation is
reasonably anticipated, and that such records are collected, reviewed, and
produced to the opposing party.” 610 Further, according to the court,
“[e]ach case will turn on its own facts and the varieties of efforts and
failures is [sic] infinite.” 611
[139] Informing the court’s analysis were the principles of negligence,
gross negligence, and willfulness. 612 Finding “no clear definition of these
terms” applicable to spoliation allegations, the court concluded they
“simply describe a continuum.
Conduct is either acceptable or
unacceptable. Once it is unacceptable the only question is how bad is the
conduct.” 613 The court reasoned that after July 2004, when Zubulake V
was issued, the “failure to issue a written litigation hold constitutes gross
negligence because that failure is likely to result in the destruction of
relevant information.” 614

609

Id. at 463. Plaintiffs were ninety-six investors seeking to recover $550 million lost
when two hedge funds were liquidated. Id. at 462 n.3. The retention efforts of thirteen of
the plaintiffs were at issue in the motion. Id.
610

Id. at 461.

611

Id. at 465.

612

Id. at 463.

613

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 463.

614

Id. at 464; cf. Haynes v. Dart, No. 08-C-4834, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1901, at *11
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010) (“The failure to institute a document retention policy, in the
form of a litigation hold, is relevant to the court’s consideration, but it is not per se
evidence of sanctionable conduct.”).
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[140] Turning to the next step of collection and review, the court noted
that “depending on the extent of the failure to collect evidence, or the
sloppiness of the review, the resulting loss or destruction of evidence is
surely negligent, and, depending on the circumstances may be grossly
negligent or willful.” 615 Thus, for example, the “failure to collect
records—either paper or electronic—from key players constitutes gross
negligence or willfulness as does the destruction of e-mail or certain
backup tapes after the duty to preserve has attached.” 616 On the other
hand, the “failure to obtain records from all those employees who had any
involvement with the issues raised in the litigation . . ., as opposed to just
the key players, could constitute negligence.” 617
[141] Whether alleged misconduct constitutes negligence versus gross
negligence or worse is significant because the answer impacts how the
party seeking sanctions goes about proving the relevance of the missing
evidence. 618 Significantly, according to the court, “[r]elevance and
prejudice may be presumed when the spoliating party acted in bad faith or
615

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 465.

616

Id. The court later clarified that by mentioning “certain backup tapes” it was not
“requiring that all backup tapes must be preserved. Rather, if such tapes are the sole
source of relevant information (e.g., the active files of key players are no longer
available), then such backup tapes should be segregated and preserved. When accessible
data satisfies the requirement to search for and produce relevant information, there is no
need to save or search backup tapes.” Id. at 479 n.99. This limitation comports with the
court’s earlier guidance in Zubulake IV and the holdings of other cases. See Oxford
House, Inc. v. Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31731, at *12 (D. Kan.
Apr. 27, 2007); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“As a general rule,
then, a party need not preserve all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates
litigation.”).
617

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 465.

618

See id. at 467. To win sanctions, the movant must establish that the alleged spoliator:
“(1) had control over the evidence and an obligation to preserve it at the time of
destruction or loss; (2) acted with a culpable state of mind upon destroying or losing the
evidence; and that (3) the missing evidence is relevant to the innocent party’s claim or
defense.” Id.
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in a grossly negligent manner.” 619 On the contrary, “when the spoliating
party was merely negligent, the innocent party must prove both relevance
and prejudice in order to justify the imposition of a severe sanction.” 620
Relevance in this regard “means something more than sufficiently
probative to satisfy Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” 621 Thus,
the “innocent party must . . . show that the evidence would have been
helpful in proving its claims or defenses — i.e., that the innocent party is
prejudiced without that evidence.” 622 Significantly, “[p]roof of relevance
does not necessarily equal proof of prejudice.” 623
[142] Applying these principles, the court rejected the defendant’s
request for a dismissal, “the most extreme sanction.” 624 The court did,
619

Id. But “application of the presumption is not required.” Id. Further, “[n]o matter
what level of culpability is found, any presumption is rebuttable and the spoliating party
should have the opportunity to demonstrate that the innocent party has not been
prejudiced by the absence of the missing information.” Id. at 468. Indeed, the “party
seeking relief has some obligation to make a showing of relevance and eventually
prejudice, lest litigation become a ‘gotcha’ game rather than a full and fair opportunity to
air the merits of a dispute.” Id.
620

Id. at 467-68.

621

Id. at 467 (citation omitted).

622

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467. This, of course, can be a difficult burden
because it is “often impossible to know what lost documents would have contained.” Id.
at 466. Thus, “[c]ourts must take care not to ‘hold[] the prejudiced party to too strict a
standard of proof regarding the likely contents of the destroyed [or unavailable]
evidence,’ because doing so ‘would . . . allow parties who have . . . destroyed evidence to
profit from that destruction.’” Id. at 468 (alteration in original). Nevertheless, the
innocent party “must present extrinsic evidence tending to show that the destroyed [ESI]
would have been favorable to [its] case.” Id.
623

Id. at 467.

624

Id. at 469. As the court noted, a “terminating sanction is justified in only the most
egregious cases, such as where a party has engaged in perjury, tampering with evidence,
or intentionally destroying evidence by burning, shredding, or wiping out computer hard
drives.” Id. at 469-70; see, e.g., Gutman v. Klein, No. 03 Civ. 1570 (BMC), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97707, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2008) (granting default judgment where
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however, conclude that plaintiffs failed to issue an appropriate litigation
hold when their duty to preserve arose. 625 While acknowledging that
counsel had “telephoned and e-mailed plaintiffs [regarding preserving and
collecting documents] and distributed memoranda instructing plaintiffs to
be over, rather than under, inclusive,” the court noted the purported hold
did “not direct employees to preserve all relevant records—both paper and
electronic—nor [did] it create a mechanism for collecting the preserved
records so that they [could] be searched by someone other than the
employee.” 626 Rather, according to the court, the “directive place[d] total
reliance on the employee to search and select what that employee believed
to be responsive records without any supervision from [c]ounsel.” 627
[143] The court concluded that none of the plaintiffs “engaged in willful
misconduct.” 628 But,—separate and apart from failing to issue an
appropriate litigation hold—the court found numerous other instances of
either gross negligence or simple negligence by plaintiffs. 629 Specifically,
certain plaintiffs “failed to execute a comprehensive search for documents
and/or failed to sufficiently supervise or monitor their employees’

defendants intentionally deleted computer files after duty to preserve arose). The court
found “no evidence of such misconduct in this case.” Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at
470.
625

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 473. Indeed, plaintiffs admitted that they did not
issue written litigation holds until 2007, whereas their duty to preserve arose in 2003. Id.
at 475-76.
626

Id. at 473.

627

Id. In the court’s view, “not every employee will require hands-on supervision from
an attorney. However, attorney oversight of the [preservation] process, including the
ability to review, sample, or spot-check the collection efforts is important.” Id. n.68.
Again, the court noted “each search must be evaluated on a case by case basis.” Id.
628

Id. at 478.

629

Id. at 477.
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document collection.” 630 Other plaintiffs “failed to collect and preserve
documents of key players.” 631 At least one plaintiff “admitted that it
destroyed backup data in 2004, after the duty to preserve at least some
backup tapes was well-established.” 632 Finally, the court noted that
“almost every plaintiff submitted a declaration [detailing their preservation
efforts] that—at best—lacked attention to detail, or—at worst—was
intentionally vague in an attempt to mislead . . . [d]efendants and the
[c]ourt.” 633
[144] On the issue of remedy, the court found that for those plaintiffs
who were grossly negligent, defendants had “‘adduced enough evidence’
that plaintiffs ha[d] failed to produce relevant documents and that the . . .
[d]efendants ha[d] been prejudiced as a result.” 634 Accordingly, the court
agreed to instruct the jury that it could presume “both the relevance of the
missing documents and resulting prejudice to the . . . [d]efendants, subject
to the plaintiffs’ ability to rebut the presumption . . . .” 635
[145] For the remaining plaintiffs, who were merely negligent in
carrying out their discovery obligations, the court concluded that
defendants “carried their limited burden of demonstrating that the lost

630

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 477.

631

Id.

632

Id.

633

Id. at 477. In addition, the court concluded several plaintiffs violated their duty to
present knowledgeable witnesses regarding “[w]hich files were searched, how the search
was conducted, who was asked to search, what they were told, and the extent of any
supervision . . . .” Id.

634

Id. at 478.

635

Pension Comm., 658 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
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documents would have been relevant.” 636 However, the court determined
prejudice to be “another matter,” recognizing that defendants had
“gathered an enormous amount of discovery—both from documents and
witnesses.” 637 Thus, the court found that a sanction less than an adverse
inference would suffice for the negligent plaintiffs “[u]nless [defendants]
[could] show through extrinsic evidence that the loss of the documents has
prejudiced their ability to defend the case.” 638 The court therefore ruled
the negligent plaintiffs were subject only to monetary sanctions, including
the defendant’s reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in
prosecuting the motion. 639 The grossly negligent plaintiffs were subject to
this monetary sanction in addition to the adverse inference charge. 640
2.

Rimkus

[146] In contrast to Pension Committee, the court in Rimkus Consulting
Group, Inc. v. Cammarata addressed allegations of intentional, rather than
negligent, destruction of evidence, 641 in the context of a dispute regarding
covenants not to compete. 642 Defendants acknowledged they had deleted
636

Id. at 479. Here, the court reasoned that “[t]he documents that no longer exist were
created during the critical time period.
Key players must have engaged in
correspondence regarding the relevant transactions.” Id.
637

Id.

638

Id.

639

Id. at 497.

640

Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.251, 497.

641

Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex.
2010) (“[A]llegations of willful misconduct: the intentional destruction of e-mails and
other electronic information at a time when they were known to be relevant to anticipated
or pending litigation.”).
642

Plaintiff alleged that defendants—its former employees—breached noncompetition
and nonsolicitation agreements and misappropriated trade secrets in launching a new
competing business. Id. at 608.
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“some arguably relevant” e-mails, but contended plaintiff could not “show
prejudice because the missing e-mails ‘would be merely cumulative of the
evidence already produced.’” 643
[147] In discussing the applicable legal principles, the court noted that
“[w]hether preservation or discovery conduct is acceptable in a case
depends on what is reasonable, and that in turn depends on whether what
was done—or not done—was proportional to that case and consistent with
clearly established applicable standards.” 644 As the Pension Committee
court recognized, this “analysis depends heavily on the facts and
circumstances of each case and cannot be reduced to a generalized
checklist.” 645 This is because in assessing sanctions a court must
“consider both the spoliating party’s culpability and the level of prejudice
to the party seeking the discovery,” both of which “can range along a
continuum.” 646 Thus, a “court’s response to the loss of evidence depends
on both the degree of culpability and the extent of prejudice.” 647 So, for
example, “[e]ven if there is intentional destruction of potentially relevant
evidence, if there is no prejudice to the opposing party, that influences the
sanctions” ruling. 648

643

Id. at 609. Indeed, the record “include[d] evidence that the defendants intentionally
deleted some e-mails and attachments after there was a duty to preserve them . . . . [and
engaged in] efforts to conceal or delay revealing that e-mails and attachments had been
deleted.” Id. at 607.
644

Id. at 613.

645

Id. (citing Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65). Likewise, according to the
Rimkus court, “[a]pplying a categorical approach to sanctions issues is also difficult.” Id.
646

Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613.

647

Id.

648

Id. Similarly, “if there is an inadvertent loss of evidence but severe prejudice to the
opposing party, that . . . will influence the appropriate response, recognizing that
sanctions (as opposed to other remedial steps) require some degree of culpability.” Id.
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[148] Applying Fifth Circuit law, the court noted that “severe sanctions,”
such as “granting default judgment, striking pleadings, or giving adverse
inference instructions may not be imposed unless there is evidence of ‘bad
faith.’” 649 That is, “‘[m]ere negligence is not enough’ to warrant an
instruction on spoliation.’” 650 Consequently, unlike in the Second Circuit,
“negligent as opposed to intentional, ‘bad faith’ destruction of evidence is
not sufficient to give an adverse inference instruction and may not relieve
the party seeking discovery of the need to show that missing documents
are relevant and their loss prejudicial.” 651 According to the court, the Fifth
Circuit’s emphasis on the “level of culpability necessary for an adverse
inference instruction limit[ed] the applicability of the Pension Committee
approach[,]” where Judge Scheindlin “imposed a form of adverse
inference instruction based on a finding of gross negligence. . . .” 652
[149] Requiring a “showing that the lost information is relevant and
prejudicial is an important check on spoliation allegations and sanctions
motions.” 653 Thus, “[c]ourts have held that speculative or generalized
assertions that the missing evidence would have been favorable to the
party seeking sanctions are insufficient.” 654 Here, the court distinguished
Pension Committee’s reasoning that because the evidence no longer exists
649

Id. at 614 (citations omitted).

650

Id. (citations omitted).

651

Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 615. The court noted “[o]ther circuits have also held
negligence insufficient for an adverse inference instruction.” Id. at 614 (citations
omitted) (listing Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits as requiring bad
faith for adverse inference, while the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits do not).
652

Id. at 615.

653

Id. at 616. The court recognized that “[s]poliation of evidence—particularly of
[ESI]—has assumed a level of importance in litigation that raises grave concerns.
Spoliation allegations and sanctions motions distract from the merits of a case, add costs
to discovery, and delay resolution.” Id. at 607.

654

Id. at 616 (citations omitted).
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it may be difficult for “an innocent party . . . to show that information lost
through spoliation is relevant and prejudicial[,]” 655 and Pension
Committee’s conclusion allowing for the presumption of relevance and
prejudice “when the spoliating party acts in a grossly negligent [rather
than intentional] manner.” 656 On the contrary, the Rimkus court
recognized that “in many cases . . . there are sources from which at least
some of the allegedly spoliated evidence can be obtained.” 657 In addition,
often the “party seeking discovery can also obtain extrinsic evidence of
the content of at least some of the deleted information from other
documents, deposition testimony, or circumstantial evidence.” 658 In fact,
that is what occurred in the case before the court, where evidence
developed by the plaintiff “included some recovered deleted e-mails and
circumstantial evidence and deposition testimony relating to the
unrecovered records.” 659 As a result, the court concluded there was
655

Id.

656

Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (citation omitted). One obvious conceptual problem
with the Pension Committee approach is that typically a negligence analysis requires
proof of harm, i.e., damages will not be presumed. See, e.g., Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d
86, 89 n.5 (10th Cir. 1972) (“Actual damage is, of course, an essential element in a
negligence action. Here damages are not presumed.”); Catasauqua Area Sch. Dist. v.
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., No. 85-3743, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11316, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 28, 1988). But, although phrased in the guise of a traditional negligence
framework, Pension Committee dispenses with the need to show harm by assuming
relevance and prejudice if the spoliation resulted from gross negligence. Pension Comm.
of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456,
467 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). And even with ordinary negligence, where Pension Committee
would require proof of relevance and prejudice, the court took pains to stress that the
burden of proof should not be “too strict.” Id. at 468. Again, this concept is not found in
traditional negligence analysis. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A
(1965) (stating that the plaintiff has the burden of proving he “has in fact suffered harm
of a kind legally compensable by damages.”).
657

Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 616.

658

Id.

659

Id. at 617-18.
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“neither a factual nor legal basis . . . to rely on a presumption of relevance
or prejudice.” 660
[150] Because the court determined that plaintiffs had made the
necessary preliminary showing of willful misconduct, it concluded that it
would present an adverse inference instruction to the jury. 661 The
instruction would “ask the jury to decide whether the defendants
intentionally deleted [ESI] to prevent [its] use in litigation” and, assuming
such misconduct, “whether . . . the lost information would have been
unfavorable to the defendants.” 662 In addition, the court awarded plaintiff
reasonable costs and fees incurred in investigating the spoliation and
prosecuting the motion. 663
3.

Victor Stanley II

[151] In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley II),
Magistrate Judge Grimm addressed a request for default judgment and
other sanctions based on one defendant’s serial spoliation of ESI. 664
Defendants acquiesced in a partial default judgment, which the court
granted. 665 More notably, the court ordered that the spoliating defendant
be imprisoned for no more than two years, “unless and until” he paid
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs awarded in connection with the
motion. 666 While acknowledging this was an “extreme sanction,” the
660

Id. at 618.

661

Id. at 620.

662

Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 620.

663

Id. at 679.

664

See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. (Victor Stanley II), 269 F.R.D. 497, 500
(D. Md. 2010) (the party “deleted, destroyed, and otherwise failed to preserve evidence;
and repeatedly misrepresented the completeness of their discovery production . . .”).

665

Id.

666

Id.
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court reasoned this was an “extreme case,” 667 calling the prejudice to
plaintiff from the destruction “unquestionable.” 668 Strikingly, the court
termed it the “single most egregious example of spoliation that [it had]
encountered. . . .” 669
[152] Victor Stanley II is instructive for its thorough exposition of the
state of the law regarding e-discovery and spoliation. 670 Initially, the court
noted that resolving spoliation motions had “proven to be one of the most
challenging tasks for judges,” particularly because of the
lack of a uniform national standard governing when the
duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence commences,
the level of culpability required to justify sanctions, the
nature and severity of appropriate sanctions, and the scope
of the duty to preserve evidence and whether it is tempered
by the same principles of proportionality that Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(2)(C) applies to all discovery in civil cases. 671
Further, the court recognized the concern that
667

Id. at 500 n.3. Indeed, defendant not only failed to implement a litigation hold, he also
actively deleted a large amount of relevant ESI. Id. at 501, 504, 506.

668

Id. at 508.

669

Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 515. According to the court, the record
“demonstrate[d] intentional misconduct done with the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence.” Id. Further, the court concluded that this “grave misconduct . . .
was undertaken for the purpose of thwarting [p]laintiff’s ability to prove its case and for
the express purpose of hamstringing this Court’s ability to effect a just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of a serious commercial tort” and that “[t]he prejudice to
[p]laintiff [was] clear.” Id.

670

See generally id. at 497. Judge Grimm even noted, “I will attempt to synthesize not
only the law of this District and Circuit, but also to put it within the context of the state of
the law in other circuits as well . . . .” Id. at 517.
671

Id. at 516.
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in some instances, [courts] imposed standards approaching
strict liability for loss of evidence, without adequately
taking into account the difficulty—if not impossibility—of
preserving all ESI that may be relevant to a lawsuit, the
reasonableness of the measures that were taken to try to
preserve relevant ESI, or whether the costs that would be
incurred by more complete preservation would be
disproportionately great when compared to what is at issue
in the case. 672
As a result, according to the court, it was not an “exaggeration to say that
many lawyers . . . view preservation obligations as one of the greatest
contributors to the cost of litigation being disproportionately expensive in
cases where ESI will play an evidentiary role.” 673
[153] Addressing the obligation to preserve evidence, the court noted
that this duty “is neither absolute, nor intended to cripple organizations”
and thus “should not be analyzed in absolute terms; it requires nuance,
because the duty ‘cannot be defined with precision.’” 674 According to the
court, “[p]roper analysis requires . . . determin[ing] reasonableness under
the circumstances—‘reasonable and good faith efforts to retain
information that may be relevant to pending or threatened litigation.’” 675
Thus, “‘the scope of preservation should somehow be proportional to the
amount in controversy and the costs and burdens of preservation.’” 676
This duty, of course, is further limited in that it “pertains only to relevant

672

Id.

673

Id.

674

Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 522 (citations omitted).

675

Id. (citations omitted).

676

Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
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documents.” 677 In sum, “assessment of reasonableness and proportionality
should be at the forefront of all inquiries into whether a party has fulfilled
its duty to preserve relevant evidence.” 678
[154] But “[u]nfortunately,” according to the court, “in terms of what a
party must do to preserve potentially relevant evidence, case law is not
consistent across the circuits, or even within individual districts.” 679 This
inconsistency concerns many litigants,
particularly . . . institutional clients such as corporations,
businesses or governments, because their activities—and
vulnerability to being sued—often extend to multiple
jurisdictions, yet they cannot look to any single standard to
measure the appropriateness of their preservation activities,
or their potential liability for failure to fulfill their
preservation duties. 680
Reasonableness and proportionality thus should play a role here as well;
that is, like the scope of the obligation to preserve, “[b]reach of the
preservation duty . . . is [also] premised on reasonableness: A party

677

Id. (citing Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
678

Id. at 523. But see Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the reasonableness and proportionality standard “may prove
too amorphous to provide much comfort to a party deciding what files it may delete or
backup tapes it may recycle”). Thus, “[u]ntil a more precise definition is created by rule,
a party is well-advised to ‘retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical
copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches.’” Id. (quoting Zubulake IV,
220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Significantly, “relevance” here “means relevance
for purposes of discovery, which is ‘an extremely broad concept.’” Id. at 436-37
(quoting Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
679

Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 523.

680

Id.
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breaches its duty to preserve relevant evidence if it fails to act reasonably
by taking ‘positive action to preserve material evidence.’” 681
[155] Interestingly, the court identified the source of the preservation
duty as being “owed to the court, not to a party’s adversary.” 682 The court
termed this “a subtle, but consequential”—indeed, some would say
controversial—“distinction.” 683
The court further noted a “proper
appreciation of the distinction informs the . . . decision regarding
appropriate spoliation sanctions.” 684 For example,
[w]here intentionally egregious conduct leads to spoliation
of evidence but causes no prejudice because the evidence
destroyed was not relevant, or was merely cumulative to
readily available evidence, or because the same evidence
could be obtained from other sources, then the integrity of
the judicial system has been injured far less than if simple
negligence results in the total loss of evidence essential for
an adversary to prosecute or defend against a claim. 685
[156] From the premise that the parties owe the preservation duty to the
court, the court noted “another, less widely discussed, injury to the civil

681

Id. at 525 (quoting Jones v. Bremen High Sch. Dist. 228, No. 08-C-3548, 2010 WL
2106640, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2010)).
682

Id. This contention presents a couple of obvious conceptual problems. First, left
unexplained is how the adversary has standing to pursue sanctions for alleged spoliation
if the duty to preserve is not actually owed to it. Likewise, if the party truly owes a duty
to the court—not the adversary—then resolving a spoliation motion would seem to put
the court in an adversarial posture towards the party accused of spoliation, rather than
functioning as an impartial decision maker.
683

Id. at 526; see supra note 682.

684

Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 526.

685

Id.
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justice system.” 686 Specifically, “‘[w]hen spoliation issues are litigated,
more attention is focused on e-discovery than on the merits, with a motion
for sanctions an increasingly common filing.’” 687
As a result,
“[a]llegations of spoliation and the motions practice that ensues interfere
with the court’s administration of justice in general by crowding its docket
and delaying the resolution of cases.” 688
V.

CONCLUSION

[157] Some five years after the amendments to the Federal Rules
governing e-discovery, it is clear that they have not met the goals of
promoting uniformity and achieving cost reduction. 689 While the relevant
Federal Rules are now uniform, their application varies widely, from when
the duty of preservation attaches 690 to what the duty encompasses, 691
686

Id.

687

Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

688

Id.

689

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the rules are meant to “secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action”); Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 9, at
1.

690

Compare Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 622
(D. Colo. 2007) (finding that preservation duty arose when suit was filed), with Phillip M.
Adams & Assocs., LLC v. Winbond Elecs. Corp., No. 1:05-CV-64, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 97305, at *21 (D. Utah Sept. 16, 2010) (finding that preservation duty arose years
before suit was filed).

691

Compare Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. at 522 (holding that reasonableness and
proportionality should govern scope of preservation), with Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that reasonableness and
proportionality may be too “amorphous” to rely upon, thus party should preserve all
relevant documents). Compare Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146,
149 (D. Mass. 2009) (rejecting demand for metadata), with Williams v. Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005) (finding that production must include all
relevant metadata unless parties agree otherwise).
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including what actions the parties must take 692 and the basis for any
sanctions resulting from a failure to act. 693 This lack of a national
governing standard and the corresponding need for a case by case analysis
leads parties to employ a lowest common denominator approach of
essentially preserving everything, which obviously increases the costs of
discovery. 694 Thus, the most critical shortcoming of the amended Rules is
their failure to restrain the exploding costs of e-discovery, 695 despite
recognition in the Rules themselves, 696 and by some—but not
enoughcourts, of the need to limit the inherent expense of such
discovery. 697 The results are predictable: parties simply do not bring cases
because they fail a rational cost-benefit analysis or, the flip side, parties
settle unmeritorious cases because it makes economic sense to do so rather
692

Compare Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that a failure to issue a written
litigation hold constitutes gross negligence), with Haynes v. Dart, No. 08-C-4834, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1901, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2010) (finding that a failure to issue
litigation hold is not per se evidence of sanctionable conduct).
693

Compare Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (allowing for adverse inference
based on gross negligence), with Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F.
Supp. 2d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (concluding that mere negligence, as opposed to
intentional destruction, not sufficient to warrant adverse inference).
694

See Orbit One, 271 F.R.D. at 436 (“Until a more precise definition is created by rule, a
party is well-advised to ‘retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies)
in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches.’” (quoting Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D.
212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003))).

695

See, e.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F.3d 842, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2010)
(noting “soar[ing]” costs related to e-discovery).
696

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (allowing for cost-shifting); FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (proportionality standard).
697

See supra note 554 and accompanying text. Compare Mancia v. Mayflower Textile
Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md. 2008) (noting court’s sua sponte duty to limit
discovery where burden or expense outweighs likely benefit), with In re Fannie Mae Sec.
Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding sanction related to overly broad
search terms without reference to proportionality analysis).
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than fight on, 698 all of which contributes to the “vanishing trial”
phenomenon. 699 These cost issues are only likely to get worse if the
increased use of experts to validate search methodologies envisioned by
the O’Keefe and Equity Analytics line of cases takes hold. 700
[158] Even with the default mode favoring over-preservation, the simple
fact is that spoliation motions are now weapons. Whatever is not
preserved serves as the basis for a sanctions motion, regardless of
relevance, prejudice, etc., and again increases litigation costs and slows
dispute resolution. 701 Given this reality, it seems clear that cooperation,
whatever its general merits, is not likely to be a viable solution to the
problems of e-discovery, particularly when the incentives—namely to run
up costs in order to force a settlementdo not favor cooperation. 702
[159] Numerous groups have recognized the problems with e-discovery
as it exists today, although solutions have been lacking. 703 But until more
698

See Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 364.

699

See supra note 472 and accompanying text; see also Bace, supra note 9, at 2-3
(quoting Justice Breyer that costs of e-discovery will “drive out of the litigation system a
lot of people who ought to be there”).
700

See supra notes 528-561 and accompanying text.

701

See, e.g., Victor Stanley II, 269 F.R.D. 487, 526 (D. Md. 2010); Rimkus Consulting
Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
702

See supra notes 491-92 and accompanying text; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007) (noting “in terrorem” increase in settlement value after
surviving motion to dismiss due to discovery costs).
703

See, e.g. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM
/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008 (“Electronic discovery . . . needs a serious
overhaul.”); SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY PILOT PROGRAM, PHASE ONE OCTOBER
1, 2009 - MAY 1, 2010, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND PREPARATION OF PRINCIPLES 7
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consistency and uniformity is brought to the application of the Rules
(whether through further amendments or otherwise), unrestrained ediscovery will continue to be a drag on the civil justice system.

(2009), available at http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/Statement%20-%20Phase%20One.pdf;
Duke Law Hosts Conference on Litigation in Federal Courts, May 10-11, DUKE LAW
NEWS, May 5, 2010, http://www.law.duke.edu/news/story?id =4933&u=11.
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